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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At its core, the discovery process in civil litigation relies on a 
balance between open access to information and protections against 
over-reaching.  Although broad discovery is favored, courts 
simultaneously warn that the civil discovery process is not meant to be a 
fishing expedition.
1
  Thus, the value of achieving justice through 
complete and thorough access to information is counter-balanced by 
equally important limiting principles.  These limiting principles include 
restrictions based on relevance, burden, expense, embarrassment, 
privilege, and proportionality.
2
  Essentially, these limiting principles 
draw on an important societal value: privacy. 
Privacy is a core concept that underlies the civil discovery rules, and 
it is one that courts must return to when resolving discovery disputes 
over digital data compilations.  These compilations, particularly when 
viewed in the aggregate, present a detailed mosaic of one’s personal life.  
The result is a highly revealing portrait of personal details that implicate 
individual privacy rights.  In some cases, discovery of the private 
portions of social media accounts or the contents of a personal 
smartphone should be limited based on privacy concerns. 
These privacy concerns can best be addressed as part of the 
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 1. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (dismissing a complaint to 
protect antitrust defendants from potentially burdensome pretrial discovery).  Although the court’s 
majority opinion did not identify the complaint as such, Justice Stevens wrote that the majority 
regarded plaintiff’s complaint as a “fishing expedition.”  Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.   
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proportionality analysis for defining the limits of civil discovery.  The 
2015 amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
emphasize a proportionality inquiry as a key limit to discovery: the 
information sought must be proportional to the needs of the case.
3
  
Although this test expressly considers the financial burden and expense 
of discovery, “burden” should go beyond mere financial considerations 
and instead encompass concepts like the privacy burden.  Thus, this 
Article proposes that the non-pecuniary burdens on privacy should be 
factored into the proportionality analysis. 
By recognizing the need for proportional privacy, courts can draw 
meaningful boundaries to define the scope of discovery, effectively 
disaggregating digital data compilations to prevent overly intrusive 
discovery.  Other tools within the court’s arsenal, such as protective 
orders, should be used more liberally to limit access to entire mosaics of 
highly personal information. 
Part II of this Article defines discovery of digital data compilations, 
using private social media account contents and smartphones in “bring 
your own device” workplaces as primary examples.  Part III explains the 
historical development of civil discovery under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure through the 2015 amendments, while Part IV 
summarizes general principles of privacy law and existing discovery 
decisions as to social media accounts and smartphones, with an analysis 
of the intersection between privacy and discovery.  In Part V, this Article 
lays out the mechanisms by which privacy protection can serve as an 
additional guide for defining the scope of civil discovery, particularly 
through examining privacy burdens as a factor in the proportionality test. 
II. DEFINING DISCOVERY OF DIGITAL DATA COMPILATIONS 
The digital age brings with it an unprecedented ability to track, store, 
and access personal information about people.  The new technology on 
which we have come to rely creates and maintains records of nearly all 
facets of daily life.  Companies collect and mine our data as part of a 
phenomenon known as “Big Data.”
4
  Personal details—from the intimate 
to the mundane—are aggregated in massive databases.  Third parties, 
                                                          
 3. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, STANDING COMMITTEE, 
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 14 (2014),  http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-
2014.pdf [hereinafter Judicial Conference Committee Summary]. 
 4. See Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 
394 (2014) (explaining the various definitions of “big data” and focusing on its social impact). 
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like internet service providers, websites, and other companies, often have 
broad access to this data and use it for marketing and other purposes.
5
 
Our daily interaction with technology not only contributes to big 
data, but our personal information is also aggregated in individual data 
compilations, such as in a social media account or on our smartphones.  
The personal information stored in these digital data compilations, in 
some ways, was voluntarily created and shared by individual users.
6
  
Nonetheless, this facet of big data still implicates its own privacy 
concerns. 
This section will examine two main examples of digital data 
compilations: private portions of social media accounts and smartphone 
contents.  These compilations contain a stunning amount of highly 
personal information—especially when looked at in the aggregate. 
A. The Social Media Example 
Social media accounts create a compilation of personal information 
over time.  Given the wealth of detailed information aggregated in a 
social media account, lawyers understandably seek out social media 
content as a potential source of evidence in litigation.  Indeed, social 
media evidence has been referenced in court decisions in criminal
7
 and 
civil cases, including family law, employment cases, personal injury 
suits, or procedural matters such as personal jurisdiction. 
                                                          
 5. Woodrow Hartzog, Social Data, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 995, 1002 (2013). 
 6. Id.  Hartzog refers to the contents of these large digital data compilations as “social data,” 
which he defines as “the massive amounts of personal information shared via the user interface of 
social technologies.”  Id. at 997; see also Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and 
Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 622 (2011) 
(describing the dramatic effect technology has on daily life and proposing ways for the Fourth 
Amendment to better protect social media and other digital content). 
 7. Social media evidence can be crucial in criminal prosecutions as well.  In one criminal case, 
a Facebook post was used to corroborate an alibi.  See Damiano Beltrami, I’m Innocent. Just Check 
My Status on Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2009)  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/nyregion/12facebook.html.  The defendant in a felony armed 
robbery contended that he was more than thirteen miles away from the crime scene at the time, using 
his father’s computer to send a Facebook status update, which read, “WHERE MY IHOP?”  
Facebook Message Frees NYC Robbery Suspect, NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 12, 2009, 6:09 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/33883605/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/facebook-
message-frees-nyc-robbery-suspect/#.UfBRlTmGj0s.  The charges against him were dropped.  Id.  
In another criminal case, MySpace photographs and captions were admissible to impeach a minor 
witness’ statement that she had been a virgin prior to an alleged rape.  In re K.W., 666 S.E.2d 490, 
494 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).  Also, MySpace photos of a criminal defendant holding wads of cash, 
wearing sunglasses, and throwing money were deemed relevant in a drug trafficking case; the photos 
were ultimately excluded as prejudicial.  United States v. Drummond, No. 1:09–cr–00159, 2010 WL 
1329059, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2010). 
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For example, in family law, social media evidence has been used in 
child custody disputes or actions to terminate parental rights.
8
  In 
employment cases,
9
 social media communications may be the basis for, 
or evidence in, harassment claims.
10
  Social media evidence also appears 
in cases involving employment contracts, such as breach of 
confidentiality agreements or non-compete clauses.
11
  Some wrongful 
discharge
12
 or discrimination suits
13
 also involve social media evidence.  
                                                          
 8. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bates, No. 11–1293, 2012 WL 1440340, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. 
Apr. 25, 2012) (holding that a mother’s posts on Facebook revealed a physical and emotional 
inability to care for her children); Adams v. Johnson, 33 So. 3d 551, 552–53 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) 
(holding that a mother’s MySpace photos depicting risqué photos of herself along with photos of her 
children invited the possibility of sexual predators viewing the photos of her children and placed her 
children in danger in a child custody determination); High v. High, 697 S.E.2d 690, 698 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2010) (holding that a father’s disturbing MySpace comments supported the family court’s 
decision to award child custody to the mother); In re T.T., 228 S.W.3d 312, 322–23 (Tex. App. 
2007) (“There was sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to conclude that [the father] set up the 
[MySpace page], which stated he was single and did not want children.”). 
 9. Although social media evidence may be relevant in employment cases, employers need to 
remain mindful of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act or, for public employers, 
Constitutional or other limitations when taking adverse employment actions in response to 
employees’ social media usage.  See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 
WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 2, 2011) (concluding that the employees’ posts on Facebook, which 
constituted the grounds for their discharge, were protected under the National Labor Relations Act, 
rendering their discharge improper). 
 10. See, e.g., Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kan., Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (D. Kan. 
2012) (considering an employee’s Facebook comments in a sexual harassment case filed against her 
employer and supervisor); Treat v. Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d 777, 788 
(N.D. Ind. 2010) (considering graphic MySpace posts by the defendant as evidence of sexual 
harassment in employment discrimination claim); Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Servs., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 
2d 77, 81 (D.P.R. 2010) (describing co-workers’ race-based Facebook comments that were presented 
as evidence of race discrimination). 
 11. See, e.g., Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 417 F. App’x 529, 530 (6th Cir. 2011) (vacating the 
district court’s order granting the plaintiff summary judgment where the plaintiff appealed her 
dismissal from nursing school on grounds of breaching confidentiality based on her MySpace post 
describing a live birth that she witnessed in class in an unflattering tone); Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11–
4303, 2011 WL 6739448, at *16–17 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011) (declining to dismiss an unfair 
competition counterclaim supported by evidence of misappropriation of a LinkedIn account by the 
plaintiff); Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a 
health care provider’s post on MySpace containing information from a patient’s medical file 
constituted sufficient evidence to satisfy the “publicity” element of the plaintiff’s invasion of privacy 
claim). 
 12. See, e.g., Jaszczyszyn v. Advantage Health Physician Network, 504 F. App’x 440, 441 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (affirming summary judgment for defendant-employer where an employee was 
terminated on grounds of fraud after her supervisor viewed Facebook photos of the employee 
drinking at a local festival despite being on leave for back pain); Treat, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 788 
(discussing a printout of a MySpace page produced by the plaintiff during discovery to bolster her 
claim of sexual harassment in the workplace and retaliatory discharge). 
 13. See, e.g., Ade v. KidsPeace Corp., 698 F. Supp. 2d 501, 510 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (granting the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment where plaintiff alleged race and national origin 
discrimination as the pretext for his termination on grounds of sexual assault after considering 
evidence from a co-worker’s MySpace account that contained sexually explicit messages from the 
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Personal injury is another area in which social media evidence is 
becoming more prevalent.  Images and statements on Facebook have 
contradicted a party’s claims of injury or damages, or have reflected 
emotional and mental state.
14
  Even more broadly, a party’s social media 
usage has also been cited for establishing personal jurisdiction.
15
  For 
example, Facebook posts have been used as a basis to establish minimum 
contacts with a forum state.
16
 
The wide range of cases relying on social media evidence is not 
surprising given the stunningly detailed personal information aggregated 
in a social media account.  Take for example Facebook, the lead social 
media website to date.
17
  On Facebook, a user sets up an account
18
 and 
lists her date of birth, the places she has lived, the schools she has 
attended, her political affiliations, her family members’ names, her 
current and present employer, and other personal details.
19
  She then 
uploads a public profile picture and cover photo.
20
 
She customizes her default privacy settings to limit the audience for 
                                                          
plaintiff). 
 14. See, e.g., Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (citing 
images of plaintiff smiling and outside of her home despite claims of permanent injury that left 
plaintiff confined to her home and bed); EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. 430, 436 (S.D. 
Ind. 2010) (noting the appropriate scope of discovery includes “profiles, postings, or messages” that 
“reveal, refer, or relate to any emotion, feeling, or mental state”). 
 15. See, e.g., Sweetgreen, Inc. v. Sweet Leaf, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–4 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(holding that the defendant’s Twitter and Facebook accounts were “informational in nature” but, 
because no business was conducted through those accounts, they did not provide a foundation upon 
which to base personal jurisdiction); Craigslist, Inc. v. Hubert, 278 F.R.D. 510, 516 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(referencing a Twitter post in a jurisdictional analysis); Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. Turner, No. 
CV10–7273 CAS (AGRx), 2011 WL 781937, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2011) (citing posts on 
Facebook and Twitter). 
 16. See, e.g., Wine Grp. LLC v. Levitation Mgmt., LLC, No. CIV. 2:11–1704 WBS JFM, 2011 
WL 4738335, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2011) (considering a company’s Facebook page in 
establishing jurisdiction); Rios v. Fergusan, 978 A.2d 592, 601 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008) (holding that 
a YouTube video sufficed to confer personal jurisdiction); Bulk Process Equip. v. Earth Harvest 
Mills, Inc., No. 10–4176 (DWF/JSM), 2011 WL 1877836, at *3–4 (D. Minn. May 17, 2011) 
(concluding that the defendant’s product promotions on Facebook, among other evidence, 
demonstrated an intentional and ongoing relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff and 
sufficient contacts with Minnesota to confer personal jurisdiction). 
 17. As of January 2015, Facebook had over 1.35 billion monthly active users.  See Gene 
Marcial, Why “Lightning-In-The-Stock” Facebook May be Top Choice for 2015, FORBES (Jan. 12, 
2015, 1:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/genemarcial/2015/01/12/why-lightning-in-the-stock-
facebook-may-be-top-choice-for-2015/. 
 18. See Facebook Help Center, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/ (last visited Sept. 
27, 2015) (explaining basic Facebook features). 
 19. See Update Your Basic Info, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/334656726616576/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 20. See Get Started, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/467610326601639/ (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2015) (providing instructions for using the features of Timeline). 
240 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
what she posts to Facebook.
21
  In this way, she determines that her 
Facebook page should be seen only by a self-selected circle of people 
and not the public at large.
22
  She even creates subsets of people, like 
“Friends except Acquaintances” and “high school friends,” so that she 
can further limit the audience for individual posts.
23
 
She downloads the Facebook app to her smartphone and grants the 
app access to her phone’s location services.
24
  This enables Facebook to 
use (and sometimes store) the geolocation data from her cell phone.
25
  As 
a typical Facebook user, she uploads photos from her computer or her 
phone,
26
 posts information about her location and places she visits,
27
 





 clicks on article links,
30
 plays games or other third-
party apps,
31
 tags Friends (or is tagged) in photos,
32
 RSVPs to events,
33
 
                                                          
 21. See Profile & Timeline Privacy, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/393920637330807/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (describing privacy 
controls for a user’s Facebook Timeline). 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Facebook Mobile Apps, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/297024380340522?sr=1&query=apps%20location&sid=0bS2CmLp
60XWabSHO (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 25. See Facebook Locations, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/115298751894487?sr=4&query=location%20&sid=0VIhBUSUNl2
LW0Utd (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 26. See How Do I Upload Photos?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/174641285926169 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 27. “Checking In” allows users to indicate their current physical location using the geo-locating 
features of their cell phones.  Thus, for example, a user may check into a coffee shop or other 
participating business, and the Timeline will show an update containing that location information.  
See Nearby Places, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/461075590584469/ (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2015). 
 28. A “like” occurs when the user hits a thumbs-up “like” button for a comment, photo, or page.  
Often, the Timeline lists those pages that a user has “liked.”  See Like, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/452446998120360/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015); Like Button, 
FACEBOOK, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/reference/plugins/like/ (last visited Sept. 27, 
2015). 
 29. The direct-messaging feature can be used to contact any user on the site, unless default 
privacy settings are adjusted to prevent such contact.  See Sending a Message, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/326534794098501 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).  Users can even 
send emails to regular email addresses using the direct-messaging feature.  A user’s email is the 
vanity username @facebook.com.  See How Do I Use My @facebook.com Email Address?, 
FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/224049364288051/?q=messages%20email&sid=0IihjxpAFjL3JLkR
T (last visited  Sept. 27, 2015). 
 30. Facebook creates links to “trending articles” that appear on users’ news feeds based on what 
their Friends or others are reading.  See How do I Customize What I See in Trending?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/1530318343864702 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 31. Examples include King’s Candy Crush Saga, and Zynga’s Farmville or Words With 
Friends.  See All Games, FACEBOOK, 
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joins groups,
34
 and engages in instant “chat” conversations.
35
 
Facebook is also linked to several apps and websites that she uses.
36
  
For example, her workout app tracks her route and time for her jogs, and 
that information can be posted to her Facebook account.
37
  Because she 
stays logged into Facebook while surfing the internet, Facebook’s social 
plugin features enable her to “like” other sites or immediately see what 
her Facebook Friends are saying on the third-party website itself.
38
  
When she fills out detailed, fun personal quizzes, those quiz results may 
appear in her Facebook account as well.
39
 
She does at least some of these Facebook activities multiple times a 
day, every day, for years.  And for most of these activities, Facebook 
creates some sort of digital record in her account.
40
  This record includes 
the things she affirmatively posts to Facebook, but it also contains data 
created by Facebook, such as IP addresses used to access the account and 
login dates.
41
  This body of data is not difficult or expensive to access—
                                                          
http://www.facebook.com/appcenter/category/games/?platform=web (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 32. Tagging occurs when a user uploads or posts information and marks that a Facebook user is 
present, pictured, or involved in that particular item.  Unless security settings are customized, tagged 
items appear just as prominently as other items on the user’s Facebook Timeline.  See What is 
Tagging and How Does It Work?, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/124970597582337/ 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 33. See Events Privacy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/216355421820757/ (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 34. See Groups, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/about/groups (last visited Sept. 27, 
2015).   
 35. See Chat Basics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/332952696782239/ (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 36. When a Facebook user gives an app permission to share an activity on her timeline, that app 
can then publish stories about her experiences within the app or on websites.  Apps for Timeline, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/386448801418869 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 37. See How Do I Connect or Disconnect My MapMyFitness Account to Facebook?, 
MAPMYFITNESS, https://support.mapmyfitness.com/hc/en-us/articles/200462650-How-do-I-connect-
or-disconnect-my-MapMyFitness-account-to-Facebook- (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 38. Other social plugins include a “Comments Box” that allows public comment on the third-
party website through a Facebook account, a “Send” button that shares a link to a particular user or 
group, and “Recommendations” that display the most-liked content from Friends.  See What are 
Social Plugins?, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/103828869708800/ (last visited Sept. 
27, 2015). 
 39. See Associated Press, Why Online Quizzes Are Taking over Your Facebook Feed, NY POST 
(Feb. 24, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/02/24/why-online-quizzes-are-taking-over-your-
facebook-feed/. 
 40. See Accessing Your Facebook Data, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/405183566203254/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (explaining that 
Facebook users may find Facebook data in either the activity log or the downloaded data). 
 41. Facebook allows users to access a downloadable file containing the following content: 
Account Status History (dates when the account was reactivated, deactivated, disabled, or deleted); 
Active Sessions (date, time, device, IP address, machine cookie, and browser information for all 
stored active sessions); Ads Clicked (dates, times, and titles of ads clicked for a limited retention 
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Because of the types of activities possible on Facebook, she 
frequently adds and edits posts.
43
  Her Facebook activity spans the whole 
day, from both her computer and her cell phone.  She knows she can 
deactivate her account for some time and reactivate it when she 
experiences social media withdrawal.
44
  But she continues to check it 
dozens of times a day.  Indeed, she can no longer function without 
Facebook: it is her main mode of staying in touch with friends and 
family, her primary means of learning about current news and events, her 
only mode of being invited to parties, her means for looking up 
information about restaurants or stores, her connection to classmates and 
coworkers, and her primary mode of email-like messaging or chatting.  




The broad range of detailed, daily personal information she posts on 
the private portions of her Facebook account captures a detailed picture 
of her daily activities and emotions.  When looked at in the aggregate, 
the account conveys highly personal, private information about her life.  
These details—easily downloaded in one file—may be sought as 
evidence in a wide range of cases.
46
 
                                                          
period); past and present addresses associated with the  account; Ad Topics (list of targeted topics 
determined using other data on the user’s Timeline); alternate names used on the account; apps; 
history of chat conversations; check-in history; personal information such as education, date of birth, 
family members, group membership, religious views, political views, gender, hometown, work, 
languages spoken, phone numbers; events joined or invited to; facial recognition data (a unique 
number used to help suggest the user to be tagged in photos); group memberships, list of friends, 
deleted friends, and followers; IP addresses used to log into the account; logins and logouts; 
messages sent and received via Facebook; photos; photo metadata; searches made on Facebook; and 
videos.  Id. 
 42. See Download All Facebook Photos, Status, Wall Posts Together in Zip File, FACEBOOK 
(Nov. 13, 2010, 3:45 AM), http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150118571353989. 
 43. See How Do I Edit a Post I’ve Shared?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/462476073850410?sr=1&query=edit%20a%20post&sid=0NfBAM
8XbzGKoQcXl (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (explaining how to edit a post after it’s been shared).  
 44. See Dr. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, To Read or Not to Read: Privacy Within Social Networks, 
the Entitlement of Employees to a Virtual “Private Zone,” and the Balloon Theory, 64 AM. U. L. 
REV. 53, 56 (2014) (noting that people increasingly must rely on modern technology like 
Smartphone apps and social media to communicate with others). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Downloading Your Info, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/131112897028467/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (describing how to 
download a zip file of one’s entire Facebook account). 
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B. The Smartphone Example 
Another example of digital data compilations is the smartphone or 
other personal computing device.  Text messages, call logs, and even app 
data may be relevant to a wide range of criminal and civil cases.
47
  
Additionally, smartphones and other personal devices are becoming an 
issue in business cases as well.
48
  The modern workplace creates a 
special challenge because personal and professional content may be 
combined on one device.  In particular, a current business trend is “Bring 
Your Own Device” (“BYOD”) policies that allow an employee to use 
their personal cell phone, tablet, or other device for work-related 
purposes rather than relying on a company-issued device.
49
  Companies 
may prefer these policies because they reduce their hardware costs, allow 
flexibility for their employees, and enable people to work from anywhere 
at all times.
50
  But BYOD workplaces also must create policies for data 
security, ownership of company information, and e-discovery issues such 
as access to and preservation of data.
51
 
                                                          
 47. See, e.g., Julie Chow, Note, “Bring Your Own Devices”: A Cautionary Tale for Public 
Employees During Investigatory Searches, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 623, 624 (2014) (discussing 
the implications of BYOD policies for public employees). 
 48. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 
F. Supp. 2d 456, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & 
N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012) (employer had duty to produce emails and documents on employee 
personal devices); Koosharem Corp. v. Spec Pers., LLC, No. 6:08-583-HFF-WMC, 2008 WL 
4458864, *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008) (same). 
 49. See Daily Document Update—Survey Finds Companies are not Communicating their 
BYOD Policies to Employees, 2012 WL 6646252 (CCH) ¶ 31,623 (summarizing survey results); 
Pedro Pavón, Risky Business: “Bring-Your-Own-Device” and Your Company, BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 
2013), at 1; Hope A. Comisky & Tracey E. Diamond, The Risks and Rewards of a BYOD Program: 
Ensuring Corporate Compliance Without Causing “Bring Your Own Disaster” at Work, 8 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 385, 386 (2014); Kimberly Peretti & Bruce Sarkisian, Peering Into Personal 
Space: Investigating Employee-Owned Mobile Devices, 17 No. 10 J. Internet L. 3, 3 (2014). 
 50. Pedro Pavón, Risky Business: “Bring-Your-Own-Device” and Your Company, BUS. L. 
TODAY (Sept. 2013), at 1. 
 51. See Henry Z. Horbaczewski & Ronald I. Raether, BYOD Bring Your Own Device: Know the 
Privacy and Security Issues Before Inviting Employee-Owned Devices to the Party, ACC DOCKET 
(April 2012) at 70, 74, http://www.ficlaw.com/links/raether/RIR_byod.pdf (explaining general 
security and business risks with BYOD policies); Philip J. Favro, Inviting Scrutiny: How 
Technologies Are Eroding the Attorney-Client Privilege, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 2 (2014) (warning 
about impact BYOD policies may have on attorney-client privilege); Ari L. Kaplan, Advice from 
Counsel: Trends That Will Change E-Discovery (and What to Do About Them Now), 12 AVE MARIA 
L. REV. 109, 110 (2014); Mark Michels & Emily Soverel, Dialing Up Potentially Responsive 
Information from Mobile Devices, ACC DOCKET (April 2014), at 48–49, 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/finance/us-fas-dialing-up-potentially-
responsive-information-from-mobile-devices-123014.pdf; John G. Browning, Burn After Reading: 
Preservation and Spoliation of Evidence in the Age of Facebook, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 273, 
276 (2013) (addressing preservation issues with BYOD workplaces). 
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Personal devices used for business result in vast amounts of personal 
information being commingled with company data.  For example, an 
employee may have her own iPhone that serves as both her personal and 
work device.  Like many modern smartphones, her iPhone functions like 
a mini computer—it allows her to do virtually any task a laptop computer 
would do.
52
  Her iPhone receives both her work emails and her personal 
emails in one mailbox.
53
  Her email accounts have calendars that sync 
her personal and professional events.
54
  She also can send and receive 
texts.
55
  Text messaging is a major avenue for communicating with her 
friends and family, but she sometimes uses texts to communicate with 
customers and coworkers.  Ironically, her least-used feature on the 
iPhone is her phone, though she still uses it for both personal and 




Apps form one of the biggest functions of her iPhone.  She uses 
Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and LinkedIn apps, which automatically 
connect to her social media accounts.
57
  She has Google Maps, which she 
uses for personal navigation as well as for directions to client meetings.
58
  




Her iPhone has a camera and stores hundreds or thousands of 
photographs and videos.  She also has apps that connect to her photos 
and videos saved in the cloud or shared with others, such as Shutterfly 
and YouTube.
60
  Most of these are personal photographs and videos, but 
she occasionally has photos and videos of products or professional events 
that she attends.  Pandora and Spotify supply her soundtrack all day 
                                                          
 52. See Why There’s Nothing Quite like iPhone, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/iphone/why-
theres-iphone/#hardware (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 53. See iPhone Support, Mail, Contacts, and Calendars, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT201320 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See iPhone Support, Phone, Message, and Facetime, APPLE, 
https://www.apple.com/support/iphone/messages/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Why There’s Nothing Quite like iPhone, supra note 52; see also Steven Tweedie, The 
13 Best Social Networking Apps, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2014, 6:18 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-best-social-networking-apps-for-iphone-android-and-windows-
phone-2014-10. 
 58. See Google Maps for Android, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en_us/mobile/maps/ 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 59. See LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015); UBER, https://www.uber.com/ 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 60. See SHUTTERFLY, http://www.shutterfly.com/mobile/?esch=1 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015); 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/devices/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
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long.
61
  Her Kindle app lets her access her entire digital library, including 
business publications.
62
  Her fitness apps help her track her sleep habits 
and activity throughout the day.
63
  Most of her shopping is done via 
Amazon, and her Amazon app
64
 gives her easy access to her entire order 
history.  She occasionally uses Tinder
65
 to find dates. 
Other apps help her stay productive on the go.  She has a dictation 
and voice memo app for making shopping lists or keeping business notes 
after a client meeting.
66
  She uses a scanner app to scan and save 
documents using her phone’s camera; Dropbox
67
 lets her access and edit 
personal and professional files stored on the cloud; Skype
68
 lets her video 
conference and message on the run; and her banking apps help her track 
her personal finances as well as business expenses.
69
 
Her smartphone creates a digital record of her communications and 
other activities.  It contains personal information about texts, phone calls, 
physical locations, and photographs that blend her personal and 
professional life.  Although most of her app data is stored in the cloud, 
her smartphone nonetheless creates some record of app activity as well.  
Quite simply, her iPhone is a portal to a complete, intimate portrait of her 
entire life. 
The sheer volume of information stored in an employee’s personal 
device increases the amount of messages and other content that may fall 
within the ambit of civil discovery.  The ease with which we create and 
store data, coupled with the increased reliance on smartphone features, 
means that BYOD policies will increase the frequency of smartphone 
discovery in business disputes.
70
 
                                                          
 61. See, e.g., PANDORA, http://www.pandora.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015); SPOTIFY, 
https://www.spotify.com/us/free (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 62. See Kindle App, AMAZON, www.amazon.com/gp/kindle/pc (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 63. See, e.g., ENDOMONDO, https://www.endomondo.com/about (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 64. See Amazon App for iPhone, AMAZON, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?docId=1000291661 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 65. See TINDER, http://www.gotinder.com/faq (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 66. See Kirk McElhearn, Beyond Siri: Dictation Tricks for the iPhone and iPad, MACWORLD 
(Sept. 23, 2013, 3:30 AM), http://www.macworld.com/article/2048196/beyond-siri-dictation-tricks-
for-the-iphone-and-ipad.html. 
 67. See Dropbox for iPhone, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/iphoneapp (last visited Sept. 
27, 2015). 
 68. See Skype for iPhone, SKYPE, http://www.skype.com/en/download-skype/skype-for-iphone/ 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 69. See Lance Davis, Best iPhone Personal Finance Apps, BANKRATE, 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/personal-finance/best-iphone-personal-finance-apps-1.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 70. See Philip J. Favro, Getting Serious: Why Companies Must Adopt Information Governance 
Measures to Prepare for the Upcoming Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 RICH. 
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Both social media accounts and smartphones are becoming the 
subject of civil discovery attempts, and the rules must adequately protect 
against overly broad discovery of these digital data compilations. 
III. CIVIL DISCOVERY GENERALLY 
Pretrial civil discovery allows the court and litigants to assess the 
truth before trial, in an effort to promote fairness and avoid surprise in 
the adversarial process.
71
  Cases are to be resolved without undue cost or 
delay.
72
  Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
allow parties to “narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties” 
by learning relevant facts through discovery.
73
  Parties are expected to 
exercise good faith and produce all non-privileged, responsive materials 
in their possession, custody, or control based on their own review first, 
before granting access to the opposing party.
74
  If relevant information is 




Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created to allow for 
liberal access to information before trial—but within limits.  Courts are 
given broad discretion to define the scope, limits, and mechanics of 
discovery in a given case.
76
  Recognized limits on civil discovery include 
embarrassment, burden, expense, harassment, or prejudice.
77
  The Rules 
also protect against disproportionate discovery.
78
  Indeed, the 2015 
amendments to Rule 26 emphasize proportionality as an additional limit 
on the scope of discovery.  By enumerating these limits, the Federal 
Rules acknowledge that overly broad access to personal information may 
                                                          
J.L. & TECH. 5, 2 (2014). 
 71. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). 
 72. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 73. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (3d ed. 
2015); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
 74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Rachel K. Alexander, E-Discovery Practice, Theory, and Precedent: 
Finding the Right Pond, Lure, and Lines Without Going on a Fishing Expedition, 56 S.D. L. REV. 
25, 43–44 (2011) (describing how the “good faith” system of discovery can be implemented 
effectively in the digital age). 
 75. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. 
 76. Crawford–El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998).  The Supreme Court recognized that 
courts have tremendous latitude in defining the scope and managing the mechanics of discovery, 
including permitting plaintiff to conduct only focused depositions of the defendant at first and 
limiting the subject matter to fact development before allowing other, broader discovery.  Id. at 600.  
Under Rule 26, “[t]he trial judge can therefore manage the discovery process to facilitate prompt and 
efficient resolution of the lawsuit . . . .”  Id. at 599. 
 77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
 78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii). 
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also taint the judicial process. 
This section will address the historical development of the discovery 
rules, including overlaps between the limits placed on civil discovery and 
the concern for individual privacy.  It will also address the ways the rules 
have adapted to deal with the challenges of electronically stored 
information (ESI) in particular, as well as the 2015 amendments 
highlighting the need for proportionality. 
A. Historical Development of the Federal Rules 
Before the 1930s, federal civil procedure required highly technical 
pleadings with little or no opportunity to discover the facts underlying 
the case.
79
  Federal courts generally followed state rules of procedure, 
which differed greatly in the amount and types of discovery devices 
permitted.
80
  This landscape created uncertainty and inconsistency in the 
civil litigation process, which many viewed as an obstacle to justice and 
that resulted in a call for reform.
81
  Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were first developed in 1938 in an effort to add transparency 
and fairness to the litigation process.
82
 
But even at that time, lawyers, judges, and academics disagreed 
about the scope of discovery that should be permitted in civil trials.
83
  
Some of the lead drafters of the Federal Rules believed that pleadings 
should be simplified while discovery should be made more expansive.
84
  
Others expressed concern about discovery abuses, blackmail, excessive 
costs—and even invasions of privacy.
85
 
Despite the debate over the scope of discovery, the initial rules 
ultimately allowed for broad discovery with little judicial intervention.
86
  
For the first time, a uniform federal procedure was enacted that allowed a 
                                                          
 79. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (3d ed. 
2015). 
 80. See Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5–6, 17 Stat. 196, 197; Steven N. Subrin, Fishing 
Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. 
REV. 691, 719 (1998) (describing the limited and inconsistent discovery mechanisms available under 
various state laws as surveyed by Ragland in Discovery Before Trial). 
 81. Subrin, supra note 80. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Notably, Charles Clark, the dean of Yale Law School and reporter for the Advisory 
Committee, advocated for less technical pleading requirements while Edson Sunderland, an expert in 
pretrial discovery, supported broad and open pretrial discovery.  See Subrin, supra note 80, at 710.  
 85. Subrin, supra note 80, at 717. 
 86. Id. at 735; see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 499 (1947). 
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broader discovery scope than any single state allowed.
87
  This new 
discovery scheme contemplated pleadings that gave only general notice 
of the claims and issues while new, expansive discovery devices allowed 
for broader inquiries into the facts.  To protect against some of the 
concerns expressed by critics, the rules also allowed for judicial 
intervention or protective orders.
88
  Thus, even though the new rules 
created the most open discovery system ever seen in the US (and 
arguably abroad),
89
 drafters and proponents still perceived the rules as 
protecting against the proverbial “fishing expedition[].”
90
 
Understandably, some early decisions applying the 1938 Federal 
Rules entertained arguments about privacy harms resulting from invasive 
discovery.  For example, one court noted that it was within the court’s 
sole discretion to deny discovery that is an oppressive and “undue 
invasion of privacy.”
91
  Other courts also noted that, while discovery 
rules are meant to promote justice and should be liberally construed, 
“they cannot be liberally construed in contravention of inhibitions 




The 1938 rules’ shift from very limited to broad discovery is 
expressly recognized in the Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in Hickman 
v. Taylor.
93
  In that case, the Court noted that the discovery rules “are to 
be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.  No longer can the time-
honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from 
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.”
94
  Yet, even with 
                                                          
 87. Subrin, supra note 80.  See also Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and 
Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 24 (2001) (noting that “American federal discovery provides for 
more liberal discovery than any other legal system in the world”). 
 88. Subrin, supra note 80, at 719–20. 
 89. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1665 
(1998). 
 90. Id. at 1684 (citing William D. Mitchell’s 1937 testimony). 
 91. Conn. Importing Co. v. Cont’l Distilling Corp., 1 F.R.D. 190, 193 (D. Conn. 1940).  There, 
the court rejected an argument that tax returns were privileged but noted that it could have 
entertained an argument about invasion of privacy:  
[o]f course, the amount of protection properly required against an undue invasion of 
privacy will rest largely on the discretion of the court.  But here the defendant, in 
Paragraph (f) of its motion, has designated just what documents it seeks to inspect; the 
plaintiff on a noticed hearing has had opportunity to protest against any oppressive 
invasion of its privacy.  No such protest has been made; the only objection raised has 
been the claim of privilege.  Furthermore, the plaintiff has itself put certain aspects of its 
income in issue.  Thus it is scarcely entitled to the protection which in another case the 
court would afford to some defendant sued, say, by a commercial competitor.  Id.  
 92. State ex rel. Cummings v. Witthaus, 219 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Mo. 1949). 
 93. 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
 94. Id. 
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its sweeping language about the broad scope of discovery, Hickman 
nonetheless recognized that courts have judicial discretion to limit 
discovery: 
[e]xamination into a person’s files and records, including those 
resulting from the professional activities of an attorney, must be judged 
with care.  It is not without reason that various safeguards have been 
established to preclude unwarranted excursions into the privacy of a 








Although several amendments occurred in the decades that followed, 
this basic approach to discovery remained unchanged for nearly half a 
century.  By the 1970s, however, judges, scholars, and lawyers were 
lamenting the abusive nature of the civil discovery process.
97
  Citing 
over-broad, costly, and oppressive tactics by counsel, critics began to 
advocate for greater limits on the amount and scope of discovery.  By the 
2000s, outcries about the cost and burden of civil discovery were 
common.  Many judges and lawyers noted that discovery abuse was 
rampant and reforms were needed.
98
  The sheer volume of discovery 
occurring in some cases prompted more concerns over the Federal Rules’ 
broad discovery scheme.  At the same time, however, other 
commentators noted that discovery costs are exaggerated by many, and 
that outcries about discovery abuses are not supported by reality.
99
 
In 2000 the Federal Rules were amended to tighten the scope of 
discovery from what is relevant to the subject matter of the action to 
information that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.
100
  
Under this revision, information relevant to the subject matter of the 
action is only discoverable upon a showing of good cause.  Further, the 
                                                          
 95. Id. at 497. 
 96. Id. at 514. 
 97. Judge Milton Pollack, Discovery—Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219, 220 (1979).   
 98. Changing the Rules: Will Limiting the Scope of Civil Discovery Diminish Accountability 
and Leave Americans Without Access to Justice Before the Subcomm. on Bankr. and the Courts of 
the Comm. of the U.S. S., 113th Cong. 42–43 (2013) (statement of Arthur R. Miller, University 
Professor, New York University School of Law). 
 99. Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery 
Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1407 (1994); 
Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
683, 684 (1998); Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear’s The 
Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649, 653–54 (1989). 
 100. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s notes (2000 Amendments). 
250 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
Supreme Court in its 2007 decision in Twombly recognized and criticized 
discovery abuse and tightened the pleading requirements under Rule 8.
101
  
Thus, even though the Federal Rules did away with fact-specific 
pleadings, Twombly made clear that “[f]actual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
102
  
Discovery as a whole was coping with the realities of its own immense 
scope and perceived cost—and evolving as a result. 
1. The 2006 Amendments 
The discovery landscape changed dramatically with the advent of 
electronically stored information (ESI), and the Federal Rules were 
amended in 2006 to address some of the challenges created by the scope 
and nature of discovery in the digital age.
103
  The amendments expressly 
confirmed that ESI is part of the ambit of discoverable information, 
required that litigants confer and consider ESI-related discovery issues 




Most significantly, however, the 2006 amendments addressed the 
issues of cost and burden associated with the broad range of data 
available in electronic forms.  The new rules allowed for cost-shifting 
and other considerations and created a two-step analysis for what ESI 
must be produced based on the ease of access to it.
105
  First, data that is 
deemed “reasonably accessible” should be produced like any other 
information: the party or witness should produce all relevant, non-
privileged information after conducting their own review.
106
  But under 
the 2006 amendments, a different, second step exists for data that is not 
reasonably accessible.  If data must be restored or recreated at great cost, 
it is presumptively undiscoverable.
107
  In order to overcome the 
presumption against discoverability, good cause must be shown.
108
  The 
                                                          
 101. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
 102. Id. at 555. 
 103. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (2006 Amendments); Julia M. Ong, 
Note, Another Step in the Evolution of E-Discovery: Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Yet Again?, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 404, 414 (2012).  
 104. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (2006 Amendments) (“Rule 26(a)(1)(B) is 
amended to parallel Rule 34(a) by recognizing that a party must disclose electronically stored 
information as well as documents that it may use to support its claims or defenses.”).  
 105. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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advisory notes to the Federal Rules list several factors considered before 
discovery of inaccessible data is permitted, including assessing the 
importance of the information sought and of the issues in the litigation.
109
  
Thus, for information that is not reasonably accessible, discovery is 
expressly limited to specific requests for important, responsive 
information in certain instances.
110
 
The two-pronged approach to ESI discovery is notable for its 
emphasis on burden and cost over the basic presumption of liberal and 
broad discovery.  The 2006 amendments try to account for the sheer 
volume of ESI that may exist in a case and provide at least some level of 
protection against undue cost or burden.
111
  At the same time, as noted by 
at least one scholar, the 2006 amendments also encourage quick-peek 
and clawback agreements, which enable parties to see otherwise non-
discoverable data.
112
  In this way, the ESI amendments shift the balance 
from protecting parties and witnesses from overly broad discovery to 
allowing access to even more data.
113
  At a minimum, ESI is meant to be 
equally discoverable as other, more traditional forms of discovery but 
with some limits based on cost and burden.  Nonetheless, ESI presents 
unique challenges and burdens for screening out private, non-
discoverable content.  It also creates a unique privacy issue because of 
the detailed and aggregate nature of some large data sets. 
2. The 2015 Amendments 
The 2015 amendments
114
 to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
emphasize, reorder, and add to the proportionality factors.  The concept 
of proportionality is mentioned in relation to several rules—from the 
scope of discovery to preservation duties.  Most notably, the revised Rule 
                                                          
 109. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (2006 Amendments) (defining the seven 
factors as “(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information available from 
other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems 
likely to have existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood 
of finding relevant, responsive, information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed 
sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further information; (6) the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties’ resources”). 
 110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Rory Bahadur, Electronic Discovery, Informational Privacy, Facebook and Utopian Civil 
Justice, 79 MISS. L.J. 317, 329 (2009). 
 113. Id. (arguing that the ESI rules obliterate informational privacy). 
 114. The 2015 Amendments are expected to take effect in December 2015.  Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure Supreme Court Order, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15_5h25.pdf.     
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26(b)(1) allows discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 
any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”
115
  
Several factors are considered to determine proportionality: 
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the 
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the  proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit.
116
 
These factors, and proportionality in general, are not a new addition 
to the rules.
117
  Some of the proportionality factors first appeared in the 
rules in the 1983 amendment.  They existed to protect against 
“disproportionate discovery” and to allow judges to discourage 
“discovery overuse.”
118
  Their purpose was to avoid unduly burdensome 
or expensive discovery when considering the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake.
119
  
From the beginning, proportionality was meant to serve as a limit on 
civil discovery itself.
120
  Two additional proportionality factors were 
added in 1993
121
 and, once again, the committee notes emphasized that 
proportionality should limit civil discovery: “the revisions in Rule 
26(b)(2) [proportionality factors] are intended to provide the court with 
broader discretion to impose additional restrictions on the scope and 
extent of discovery[.]”
122
  Despite the Committee’s express intent to 
make proportionality a limit on discovery, courts seemed to under-utilize 
the proportionality factors.  In 2000, the Committee added a cross-
reference to the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1), again in an 
effort “to emphasize the need for active judicial use of subdivision (b)(2) 
[proportionality factors] to control excessive discovery.”
123
 
Thus, the 2015 amendments make three major changes as to 
proportionality of civil discovery: (1) move the proportionality factors to 
                                                          
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015 Prospective Amendments). 
 116. Id.  
 117. See Judicial Conference Committee Summary, supra note 3, at Rules App’x B-5; see also 
Thomas Y. Allman, Local Rules, Standing Orders, and Model Protocols: Where the Rubber Meets 
the (E-Discovery) Road, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 73 (2013) (describing local initiatives to make e-
discovery more fair and affordable).  
 118. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (1983 Amendments). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. The existing two factors were also moved to a different subpart of Rule 26.   
 122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (1993 Amendments). 
 123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (2000 Amendments). 
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a more prominent placement within Rule 26, (2) reorder the existing 
proportionality factors to make “importance of the issues at stake” the 
first factor, rather than leading with the amount in controversy, and (3) 
add a final factor of “the parties’ relative access to relevant 
information.”
124
  Critics of these changes felt that they favor defendants, 
allow for too much subjectivity and flexibility, will result in blanket 
“proportionality” objections to civil discovery requests, and require a 
multi-factor test that places too great a burden on the court.
125
  
Additionally, some critics felt that proportionality already exists in 
discovery, making these changes unnecessary.
126
 
Even with the renewed emphasis on proportionality in the 2015 
amendments, the proportionality test itself largely focuses on economic 
concerns.  Indeed, the “burden or expense” that the court weighs against 
the needs of the case are largely financial burdens.
127
  Critics of the 2015 
amendments have pointed out that the proportionality test may be abused 
by large corporate litigants who will shield otherwise discoverable 
information on economic grounds alone.
128
  Although some view 
discovery as financially burdensome and overly broad, others have 
pointed out that arguments as to undue cost are exaggerated and result in 
an unfair advantage to large corporate interests.
129
  Further, some have 
noted that non-pecuniary considerations should also be taken into 
account when weighing the proportionality factors.
130
 
                                                          
 124. See Judicial Conference Committee Summary, supra note 3, at Rules App’x B-8. 
 125. Id. at Rules App’x B-5. 
 126. Id.  
 127. See id. 
 128. See Stephen B. Burbank, Proportionality and the Social Benefits of Discovery: Out of Sight 
and Out of Mind?, 34 REV. LITIG. __ (forthcoming 2015) (warning that courts should not privilege 
costs over the benefits of litigation or monetary considerations over variables that are not as easily 
quantified). 
 129. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil 
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 779–80 (2010); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, NATIONAL 
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 27–33 (2009), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf (median costs of discovery, 
including attorney’s fees, are less than four percent of defendants’ reported stakes); see also Danya 
Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 
90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1116–23 (2012). 
 130. The Sedona Conference®, The Sedona Conference® Commentary on Proportionality in 
Electronic Discovery, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 289, 300 (Conor R. Crowley et al. eds.) (2010) (Principle 
5 states that “[n]onmonetary factors should be considered when evaluating the burdens and benefits 
of discovery.”); John L. Carroll, Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale, 32 CAMPBELL L. 
REV. 455, 464 (2010) (explaining the dangers of over-emphasizing monetary factors alone in the 
proportionality analysis); Theodore C. Hirt, The Quest for “Proportionality” in Electronic 
Discovery-Moving from Theory to Reality in Civil Litigation, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 171, 199 (2011) 
(arguing that proportionality may still be used as a limit in non-monetary or low-value cases); Jordan 
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Other changes in the 2015 amendments further clarify the limits that 
exist on overly broad discovery.  These changes include streamlining the 
language in Rule 26(b)(1), which describes discoverable matters, and 
removing “subject-matter discovery” in favor of confining discovery to 
the parties’ claims and defenses, absent a showing of good cause.
131
  
Notably, the amendments also replace “reasonably calculated to lead” to 
admissible evidence with the statement that “[i]nformation within this 
scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be 
discoverable.”
132
  This change clarifies that “reasonably calculated” was 
never intended to define the scope of discovery.
133
  Further, Rule 26 now 
makes clear that allocation of expenses may be included in protective 
orders, without intending to make cost-shifting a common practice.
134
  
The 2015 amendments also emphasize increased cooperation among the 
parties
135
 and greater judicial oversight of the discovery process.
136
 
As a whole, the 2015 amendments take into account the sheer 
volume of data that exists in many cases and attempt to create additional 
boundaries to the scope of discovery.  Most notably, the Federal Rules 
will now require more careful consideration of the proportionality of 
discovery. 
B. Relevance, Proportionality, and Protective Orders 
Even with 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules, civil discovery, as 
a general proposition, still broadly encompasses all relevant information. 
Information is relevant if it “‘bears on’ or might reasonably lead to 
information that ‘bears on’ any material fact or issue in the action.”
137
  
Because relevance is a broad concept, it is difficult to apply in the 
                                                          
M. Singer, Proportionality’s Cultural Foundation, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 145, 149 (2012) 
(“disproportionate discovery is caused not by abuse of attorney discretion, but by a breakdown of the 
core values and cultural norms that typically animate civil litigation”); Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin 
D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm, Rather Than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 513, 529 (2010) (advocating for proportionality to be the default, threshold rule for defining 
the scope of discovery, including the use of non-monetary factors in the proportionality analysis); 
Leah M. Wolfe, Comment, “The Perfect is the Enemy of the Good”: The Case for Proportionality 
Rules Instead of Guidelines in Civil E-Discovery, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 153, 189 (2015) (noting that 
the Sedona Principles support judicial consideration of any nonmonetary factor when determining 
proportionality-based limits of discovery). 
 131. See Judicial Conference Committee Summary, supra note 3, at Rules App’x B-9. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at Rules App’x at B-10. 
 134. Id. at Rules App’x at B-10–11. 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s notes (2015 Amendments). 
 136. See id. 
 137. Dongguk Univ. v. Yale Univ., 270 F.R.D. 70, 72–73 (D. Conn. 2010). 
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abstract, and instead should be grounded in particular facts and 
circumstances of each case.
138
  Fishing expeditions and requests for 
unfettered discovery are disallowed.
139
  Rather, discovery requests must 




Proportionality, as first established in the 1983 amendments, already 
serves as a backstop to overly broad discovery and promotes “fair and 
efficient operation of discovery rules.”
141
  Proportionality can limit 
discovery even when discovery requests are otherwise reasonably 
calculated to lead to admissible evidence: 
[a]fter satisfying this threshold requirement counsel also must make a 
common sense determination, taking into account all the circumstances, 
that the information sought is of sufficient potential significance to 
justify the burden the discovery probe would impose, that the discovery 
tool selected is the most efficacious of the means that might be used to 
acquire the desired information (taking into account cost effectiveness 
and the nature of the information being sought), and that the timing of 
the probe is sensible, i.e., that there is no other juncture in the pretrial 
period when there would be a clearly happier balance between the 




Thus, courts possess the power to limit the scope of discovery to 
meet the needs of the case and should take proportionality into account.  
However, the proportionality requirement does not “obligate courts to 
conduct a detailed balancing of the enumerated factors” in every case.
143
  
Instead, proportionality serves as an additional limit and tool for active 
judicial management of the discovery process.
144
 
                                                          
 138. See id. at 73. 
 139. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (dismissing a complaint to 
protect antitrust defendants from potentially burdensome pretrial discovery).  Although the court’s 
majority opinion did not identify the complaint as such, Justice Stevens wrote that the majority 
regarded plaintiff’s complaint as a “fishing expedition.”  Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 
Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Allowing this case to 
proceed absent factual allegations that match the bare-bones recitation of the claims’ elements would 
sanction a fishing expedition costing both parties, and the court, valuable time and resources.”). 
 140. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(A) (a discovery request “must describe with reasonable 
particularity each item or category of items to be inspected”).   
 141. Dongguk, 270 F.R.D. at 73.  
 142. In re Convergent Techs. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
 143. In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 144. See id.; see also The Sedona Conference®, The Sedona Conference® Commentary on 
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 14 Sedona Conf. J. 155, 158 (Conor R. Crowley et al. eds.) 
(2013) (discussing the origins of proportionality, providing examples of its application, and 
proposing principles to guide courts, attorneys, and parties). 
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Despite the flexibility of the proportionality factors, cases applying 
the proportionality test mainly focus on financial burden.
145
  But even 
financial burden is difficult to quantify in some cases, as clear ratios 
between the cost of discovery and the value of the underlying claim 
cannot be assessed.
146
  Additionally, other factors expressly contemplate 
non-financial consideration, such as the importance of the issues at stake 
in the litigation.  This factor implicates broader societal values that are 
not subject to mathematical calculation.
147
  Thus, the proportionality 
analysis necessarily incorporates non-monetary considerations, such as 
vindication of personal or private values,
148
 even though the expense of 
discovery is the main focus of the proportionality inquiry in many cases. 
In addition to proportionality-based limits, the rules allow courts to 
issue protective orders for good cause in order to protect against 
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”
149
  
Protective orders are an additional tool available for courts to prevent 
discovery abuses.
150
  The good cause standard requires particular facts 
demonstrating potential harm, and not on conclusory allegations.
151
  The 
party seeking the protective order must show a particular need for 
protection, rather than broad allegations of harm.
152
  Further, the harm 
must be significant.
153
  Nonetheless, harms such as embarrassment, if 
particularly serious, can be grounds for good cause.
154
 
                                                          
 145. See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 364 (D. Md. 2008) 
(noting that discovery might be excessive in relation to the value of the plaintiffs’ claims).  
Nonetheless, at least one case has expressly considered nonmonetary burdens when limiting 
discovery.  See Hunter v. Ohio Indem. Co., No. C 06-3524, 2007 WL 2769805, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 21, 2007) (“the burden of a deposition on Ms. Jansen, who has virtually no knowledge of any 
issues specific to the coverage at issue, and is caring for a spouse with a life-threatening illness, 
would be inhumane as well as unproductive.”). 
 146. See id. 
 147. See Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality 
in Discovery, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Legal Scholarship Repository, Paper No. 1521, at 5–6 (2014), 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1521. 
 148. See Judicial Conference Committee Summary, supra note 3, at Rules App’x B-42. 
 149. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
 150. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34–36 (1984). 
 151. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (protective order properly 
used to restrict press access to discovery in environmental tort case).  By analogy, courts restrict 
similar public access to pretrial criminal hearings because the interest in a fair trial and privacy 
outweigh the public’s right to access.  Id. at 11 (citing In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47 (1st 
Cir. 1984)). 
 152. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.; Jonathan M. Redgrave et al., Understanding and Contextualizing Precedents in E-
Discovery: The Illusion of Stare Decisis and Best Practices to Avoid Reliance on Outdated 
Guidance, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 40 (2014) (noting that protective orders may not suffice to 
protect individual privacy interests). 
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As a whole, courts can limit discovery due to undue burden and 
expense under the proportionality limits, and can use protective orders as 
another method by which to mitigate the harm of overly burdensome 
discovery.
155
  As with discovery in general, courts are given wide 
discretion to fashion protective orders to address the wide range of harms 
contained in a particular case.
156
  Thus, protective orders may be used for 
reasons beyond the enumerated ones.
157
 
The rules have evolved to adapt to the modern realities of litigation 
and technological advancements over time, and the 2015 amendments 
appear to continue the trend of limiting the broad scope of civil 
discovery.  In particular, proportionality, relevance, and protective orders 
serve as major tools for judges in managing discovery’s scope.  
Nonetheless, the law must continue to adapt to the realities of new 
technology and privacy implications of massive digital data compilations 
and modern data collection.
158
 
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF PRIVACY LAW AND CIVIL DISCOVERY IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 
The very existence of large digital data compilations and potential 
access to them in discovery implicate privacy concerns.  Indeed, privacy 
harm impacts fundamental values of a free society, such as freedom of 
speech, association, and expression.
159
  Generally, the advent of social 
media and smartphones has triggered a re-examination of existing 
privacy law principles.
160
  The digital age has only exacerbated the 
challenges of creating principled and effective privacy protections.  New 
technology encourages (or even forces) people to expose traditionally 
private spheres to public view and to share more personal information 
                                                          
 155. See Dongguk Univ. v. Yale Univ., 270 F.R.D. 70, 73 (D. Conn. 2010) (“With regard to the 
‘undue burden and expense’ provision, Rule 26(c) operates in tandem with the proportionality limits 
set forth in Rule 26(b)(2).”). 
 156. Id. (“The text of Rule 26(c) is construed liberally to include a wide range of potential harms 
not explicitly listed.”). 
 157. See id. 
 158. See Jonathan M. Redgrave et al., Understanding and Contextualizing Precedents in E-
Discovery: The Illusion of Stare Decisis and Best Practices to Avoid Reliance on Outdated 
Guidance, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 6 (2014). 
 159. See Woodrow Hartzog, The Value of Modest Privacy Protections in a Hyper Social World, 
12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 333, 345–46 (2014); Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: 
Associational Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 611 (2014). 
 160. See, e.g., Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face 
Recognition Privacy in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 165, 167 (2012); Felix T. Wu, 
Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (2013). 
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than ever before.
161
  But as society adjusts to a new world of over-
sharing, the current state of the law facilitates an erosion of privacy 
rights through its incomplete and ineffective treatment of modern privacy 
concerns.  Nonetheless, new theories of privacy are emerging in light of 
the privacy harms we now face, and some of those theories can inform 
(and improve) the civil discovery process. 
The term “privacy” itself is vague and imprecise, and the U.S. legal 
system struggles to define adequate privacy protections in many different 
contexts.  A comprehensive body of “privacy law” does not exist, and 
instead privacy protection draws on different sources of law and notions 
of harm.
162
  This results in an unclear patchwork of statutes or 




In the civil discovery context, privacy harms may seem less severe 
than in other areas, such as Fourth Amendment law.  Nonetheless, while 
the need for open access to information in civil litigation justifies some 
intrusion, privacy harms cannot be completely ignored simply because a 
civil case is pending.  Rather, even civil discovery has limits—limits that 
necessarily draw on important privacy-based principles. 
This section will provide an overview of privacy law, including 
information privacy, physical autonomy, private spaces, and cell phones; 
and the emerging “mosaic theory” of privacy.  It will also explain 
privacy’s role in civil discovery, both as to established categories of 
privacy protection and as to cases addressing social media and 
smartphone discovery. 
A. Overview of Privacy Law 
Scholars have attempted to divide and categorize the types of privacy 
rights recognized under various sources of U.S. law.  These divisions 
include “states” of individual privacy (such as solitude, intimacy, and 
anonymity),
164
 categories of substantive law (tort law, Fourth 
Amendment law, First Amendment law, and state constitutions, for 
                                                          
 161. Dr. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, To Read or Not to Read: Privacy Within Social Networks, The 
Entitlement of Employees to a Virtual “Private Zone,” and the Balloon Theory, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 
53, 55 (2014) (noting that people increasingly must rely on modern technology like smartphone apps 
and social media to communicate with others). 
 162. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 481 (2006). 
 163. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier 
for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 208 (1992); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and 
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1611 (1999). 
 164. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31–32  (1967). 
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example),
165
 and spaces or activities protected (such as physical space, 
personal choices, and personal information).
166
  Other scholars have 
honed in on the privacy harm that may occur.
167
 
Taken as a whole, no clear definition of “privacy” exists and, not 
surprisingly, no cohesive privacy law has emerged to date either.  
Nonetheless, as relevant to civil discovery, three general concepts of 
privacy rights become particularly important: (1) the right to control 
one’s personal information, (2) the right to physical autonomy and 
protection against intrusion into one’s private sphere, including 
smartphones or cell phones, and (3) the emerging “mosaic theory” of 
privacy rights. 
1. Information Privacy 
Information privacy involves protecting against the collection and 
use of personal information.  Like many theories of privacy, information 
privacy can be difficult to define and overlaps with other concepts or 
substantive areas of law.  Nonetheless, the interest in keeping 
information about oneself private—both in its creation and use—is an 
important concept to consider within the broader framework of civil 
discovery. 
A patchwork of substantive law serves as the main mode of 
protecting information privacy.  For example, tort law provides a remedy 
when private facts are publicized or when there is an intrusion upon 
one’s seclusion.
168
  Other torts, like defamation, breach of 
confidentiality, infliction of emotional distress, and related dignitary torts 
protect one’s reputation or sense of autonomy.
169
  Property rights may 
protect information privacy, such as through conversion and trespass 
claims.
170
  Contract law may be used to ensure confidentiality of 
                                                          
 165. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1992). 
 166. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 
1202–03 (1998).  Professor Kang refers to these three concepts as decisional, spatial, and 
informational privacy.  Id. 
 167. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 162, at 564; M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 
86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1162 (2011); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 877, 885 (2003). 
 168. Scholars cite a famous law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis as 
the origin of modern privacy torts.  See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  At least four distinct privacy torts emerged from this article, 
including (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private facts, (3) false light, and (4) 
appropriation.  See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 169. See Prosser, supra note 168, at 398. 
 170. See Solove, supra note 162, at 552. 
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information within certain contractual relationships.
171
  Even criminal 
law includes some protection against misappropriation and misuse of 
one’s personal information, such as through criminal penalties for 
wiretapping and identity theft.
172
 
In addition to the common law, several state and federal statutes 
create a patchwork of narrow laws protecting specific bits and pieces of 
information.  Examples include: 








 Stored Communications Act, preventing web service providers 
from disclosing information to third parties without consent;
175
 




















                                                          
 171. See id. at 529.  
 172. See, e.g., Federal Wire Tap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012) amended by Electronic 
Communications Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986). 
 173. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2012); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012); 
Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012); Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 
U.S.C. § 222 (2012); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). 
 174. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012). 
 175. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). 
 176. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1221 (2012). 
 177. Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012). 
 178. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012). 
 179. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
 180. Federal Wiretapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012), amended by Electronic 
Communications Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986); Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need For 
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This list is but a few examples.  Dozens of other state and federal 
laws limit the collection and use of personal information, but in narrowly 
defined circumstances.  As demonstrated by this web of statutory 
provisions, U.S. law has evolved in a piecemeal fashion, providing little 
comprehensive privacy protection.  At the same time, the very existence 
of so many piecemeal information privacy statutes indicates that we 
value protecting information privacy enough to place privacy-based 




In addition to the common law and statutory examples, 
Constitutional law provides another source of possible protection of 
information privacy.  The First Amendment protects one’s right to speak 
anonymously and protects against forced disclosure of one’s 
associations.
182
  The Fourth Amendment’s protections against 
unreasonable search and seizure also border on information privacy, such 
as protecting phone conversations on a public pay phone.
183
 
Most notably, the Fifth Amendment’s substantive due process 
protections may include protecting one’s personal matters from 
disclosure.  In Whalen v. Roe,
184
 the court examined the constitutionality 
of a New York state statute that required the state to collect personal 
information about patients who are prescribed certain drugs.
185
  Although 
the statute was ultimately upheld as constitutional, the Supreme Court 
noted that a privacy interest exists in “avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters.”
186
  However, the Court stopped short of defining an express 
constitutional right to information privacy.
187
  Similarly, in Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services,
188
 the Court acknowledged a privacy 
interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal matters” but rejected any 
such concern as to matters of public interest concerning a public 
official.
189
  Subsequently, in NASA v. Nelson,
190
 the Supreme Court once 
                                                          
Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and Interception of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 39 (2003). 
 181. See James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 7 (2003). 
 182. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 183. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967). 
 184. 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977); see also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 
(1977). 
 185. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591. 
 186. Id. at 599.   
 187. Id. at 605–06. 
 188. 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977). 
 189. Id. at 457, 455–58 (holding that an act requiring retention and access to presidential records 
is not an unconstitutional invasion of former President Nixon’s privacy rights). 
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again seemed to recognize a constitutional right to information privacy 
but fell short of defining or enforcing such a right.  There, the Court 
“assume[d], without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy 
right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon”
191
 and instead noted 
that statutory protections applied (but were not violated).
192
  Thus, the 
Court upheld as constitutional background-check questionnaires that 
were required as part of government employment.
193
 
Even though these cases did not enforce a constitutional right of 
information privacy, they indicate that some type of constitutional limits 
on the collection and use of personal information may exist.  At least one 
state’s constitution goes even further to protect information privacy.  
California’s constitution contains a fundamental right to privacy that 
applies to both state actors and private individuals.
194
  This constitutional 
provision has even been applied to nongovernmental entities to limit the 
scope of civil discovery.
195
 
Although information privacy is developing as a distinct aspect of 
privacy law, constitutional protection remains undefined and vague.  
Statutory provisions provide some protection, but the web of laws that 
govern this area is complex and incomplete.  These existing privacy laws 
may be inadequate in protecting individuals against overly intrusive 
disclosure of personal information. 
2. Physical Autonomy, Private Spaces, and Cell Phones 
The U.S. Constitution also creates privacy-based protections for 
physical autonomy and against government intrusion into physical 
spaces.  Physical autonomy involves the fundamental right to make 
decisions about one’s body.  Examples include the decision to terminate 
a pregnancy,
196
 the right to marital privacy,
197
 and the right to private 
sexual autonomy.
198
  Physical autonomy relies on a fundamental right to 
                                                          
 190. 562 U.S. 134 (2011). 
 191. Id. at 138. 
 192. See id. at 159 (“In light of the protection provided by the Privacy Act’s nondisclosure 
requirement, and because the challenged portions of the forms consist of reasonable inquiries in an 
employment background check, we conclude that the Government’s inquiries do not violate a 
constitutional right to informational privacy.”) (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.   
 195. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994). 
 196. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
 197. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (decision to procreate); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (contraception use). 
 198. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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privacy under the U.S. Constitution and serves as a limit on government 
intrusion into these private decisions and activities. 
Similarly, the U.S. Constitution creates privacy-based protections 
against intrusion into one’s physical space, such as one’s home and 
private papers.
199
  Fourth Amendment law applies in the specific context 
of government intrusion into private spheres, and prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures by law enforcement, without first showing 
probable cause.  At its core, the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
governmental “fishing expedition” searches by requiring a warrant or a 
specific exception to the warrant requirement.  Additionally, warrants 
must be particularized, describing what will be searched and for what 
specific evidence.  Searches that incidentally capture irrelevant 
information or that extend to information about innocent third parties 
may also violate the Fourth Amendment.
200
 
Although the Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful search 
and seizure into these physical spaces, it has considerable limitations.  
These limitations include the reasonable expectation of privacy standard 
and the third-party disclosure rule.  Generally, in order for Fourth 
Amendment protection to apply, the person must have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.
201
  This expectation must be objectively 
reasonable and not merely subjective.
202
  Additionally, disclosure of 
private information to third parties undermines any argument that an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy exists.
203
 
In the digital age, these limitations can prove fatal for attempts to 
apply privacy protection to most content transmitted electronically, given 
that an internet service provider, website, or other third party receives 
and transmits content.
204
  Further, interactive “social” tools like 
                                                          
 199. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 200. See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1460–62 (1996) (explaining how innocent third parties 
may have greater privacy rights, but how they have the least incentive or fewest procedural 
mechanisms to enforce their Fourth Amendment privacy rights); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 
(1985) (noting that a heightened standard of reasonableness may apply when the privacy intrusion of 
the search is more severe).  Electronic surveillance methods increase the likelihood that innocent 
third party information is captured in a search.  Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment 
Implications of the Government’s Use of Cell Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 1, 18 (2013) (“the production of cell-site location information has resulted in significant 
breaches of innocent third parties’ privacy rights.”). 
 201.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)  
(expectation of privacy must not only be subjective, but also objectively reasonable).  
 202. Id. 
 203. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
745 (1979). 
 204. See Brian L. Owsley, Triggerfish, Stingrays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing Expeditions, 
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Facebook are premised on sharing,
205
  so expectations of privacy to 




Nonetheless, in the Fourth Amendment context, courts have 
recognized that using social media websites’ privacy settings is relevant 
in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.  In 
United States v. Meregildo,
207
 the court examined whether probable 
cause is needed before law enforcement can search private Facebook 
content.
208
  The court noted that public postings are not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, but “postings using more secure privacy settings 
reflect the user’s intent to preserve information as private and may be 
constitutionally protected.”
209
  Further, some commentators have noted 
that, while there is no reasonable expectation to privacy in social media 
posts generally, certain private posts should be afforded some protection 
based on the specific type of data that is involved.
210
  Privacy also must 
be viewed in the context of society.
211
  Because privacy is subject to 
broad and imprecise definitions, it is best viewed in relation to the harm 
that may be caused to an individual.
212
  At the same time, privacy law 
must adapt to the new realities of people living their lives online.
213
 
                                                          
66 HASTINGS L.J. 183, 227 (2014).  
 205. For example, Facebook makes clear that its mission is to provide a platform for sharing and 
connecting with others: “Founded in 2004, Facebook’s mission is to give people the power to share 
and make the world more open and connected.  People use Facebook to stay connected with friends 
and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to 
them.”  About Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page_info (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2015). 
 206. Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 207. 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was not 
violated when law enforcement received private social media information from a Facebook “friend” 
of the defendant). 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id. at 525.  
 210. Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 227, 
242, 246–47 (2012). 
 211. See Solove, supra note 162, at 482–84 (attempting to develop a new way of looking at 
privacy based on harms created by various privacy problems). 
 212. Id. at 486–88. 
 213. See Teri Dobbins Baxter, Low Expectations: How Changing Expectations of Privacy Can 
Erode Fourth Amendment Protection and a Proposed Solution, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 599, 599–600 
(2012) (“[T]echnology has . . . brought about significant cultural shifts.  One prominent example is 
the way that people, particularly young people, socialize and become socialized.”); Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial 
Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 619 (2011) (“[A] future is nearly upon us that will make it impossible 
to preserve the privacy even of traditional Fourth Amendment bastions, such as the home, without 
considering the intertwined effects of technological and social change.”); Stephen E. Henderson, 
Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 
MERCER L. REV. 507, 511 (2005) (arguing for a strict and narrow construction of reasonable 
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Smartphones further complicate the analysis.  The Supreme Court 
recently acknowledged that new technology and easy access to vast 
amounts of digital content is testing the traditional Fourth Amendment 
analysis of privacy interests.  In particular, the Court in Riley v. 
California
214
 made clear that searches of cell phone content require a 
warrant, even when the phone is seized incident to a lawful arrest.
215
  The 
Court compared smartphones (which it refers to as “cell phones”) to mini 
computers that “place vast quantities of personal information literally in 
the hands of individuals” and acknowledged that serious privacy 
concerns exist when cell phone content is accessed by law 
enforcement.
216
  Indeed, unlike traditional, physical objects, “[m]odern 
cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those 
implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”
217
  The 
Court detailed how a modern cell phone now contains thousands of 
pieces of information, including pictures, videos, call logs, text 
messages, internet browsing history, and calendar entries.
218
  If in 
physical form, this level of detailed, portable content would never be 
carried around by a person, yet cell phones allow easy access to an entire 
digital archive of one’s life.
219
 
The Court described at length the privacy implications of cell phone 
content: 
The storage capacity of cell phones has several interrelated 
consequences for privacy.  First, a cell phone collects in one place 
many distinct types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, 
a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more in combination than 
any isolated record.  Second, a cell phone’s capacity allows even just 
one type of information to convey far more than previously possible.  
The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a 
thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; 
the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked 
into a wallet.  Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase 
of the phone, or even earlier.  A person might carry in his pocket a slip 
                                                          
expectation of privacy so that the law can adapt to new technologies); Stephen E. Henderson, After 
United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 
431, 433 (2013) (noting a positive trend toward doing away with a strict third party doctrine). 
 214. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 215. Id. at 2493. 
 216. Id. at 2486–89. 
 217. Id. at 2488–89. 
 218. See id. at 2489. 
 219. See id. at 2489–90; see also Charles E. MacLean, But Your Honor, a Cell Phone is not a 
Cigarette Pack: An Immodest Call for a Return to the Chimel Justifications for Cell Phone Memory 
Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 6 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 37, 57 (2012) (“Cell phones are more like 
extensive computers than wallets.”).  
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of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he would not carry a record 
of all of his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several 
months, as would routinely be kept on a phone.
220
 
Thus, the Court acknowledged the unique and comprehensive data 
compilation contained in a modern cell phone.  Citing Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones,
221
 the Court also 
noted how cell phone content can even reveal historic location 
information that can convey a minute-by-minute account of one’s 
specific movements.
222
  Taken as a whole, the content on one’s cell 
phone rivals the level of intimate details stored in one’s house, and a cell 
phone can hold the key to cloud-based data as well.
223
  Access to this 
amount of information burdens privacy rights. 
In sum, the Court recognized a privacy concern unique to new 
technology like cell phones: some Fourth Amendment protection is 
needed for the archive of personal details—from mundane to intimate—
of one’s life contained in an easily accessible digital format.
224
  The 
challenge of new technology cannot be addressed by merely analogizing 
to physical records; rather, a rule is needed to address the privacy 
concerns surrounding cell phones in particular.
225
  The Court also noted 
that a standard based on the reasonable belief that a cell phone will 
contain relevant evidence is unworkable, given the sheer volume of data 
contained on a cell phone.
226
  In essence, police could always find some 
sort of potential evidence, so such a standard “would in effect give 
‘police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a 
person’s private effects.’”
227
  Ultimately, the Court treated digital 
searches as unique and established a warrant requirement for law 
enforcement accessing cell phone content—even incidental to arrest.
228
 
Although Riley recognized the unique privacy implications of 
warrantless searches of cell phone content, traditional Fourth 
Amendment principles provide little protection of digital data compiled 
through electronic means over time.  While statutory law provides 
                                                          
 220. Id. at 2489. 
 221. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 222. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490. 
 223. Id. at 2491. 
 224. Id. at 2490. 
 225. Id. at 2493. 
 226. Id. at 2492. 
 227. Id. at 2492 (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009)). 
 228. Id. at 2493. 
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narrow slivers of restrictions on its use and collection,
229
 electronic 
compilations of public information are given little privacy protection 
because of the third-party disclosure rule or the reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  Yet scholars have urged—and courts have begun to 
recognize—that traditional notions of privacy may be inadequate to 
address current and emerging technologies. 
3. The Mosaic Theory of Privacy 
The “mosaic theory” is an emerging concept in Fourth Amendment 
law that redraws the lines between public and private.  The mosaic 
theory stands for the proposition that traditionally public information, 
when collected over time and viewed in the aggregate, should be 
afforded some privacy protection because of the detailed mosaic of one’s 
life these bits of information paint.
230
  In other words, new technology 
allows us to capture so many individual details of public life that, when 
viewed as a whole, invade one’s privacy. 
To date, courts applying the Fourth Amendment have not fully 
embraced mosaic theory, but several opinions indicate the potential 
viability of a mosaic approach to privacy.  In United States v. 
Maynard,
231
 the D.C. Circuit considered GPS monitoring that tracked a 
suspected drug dealer’s public movements for 28 days and compiled over 
2,000 pages of data.  There, the court noted that these movements, even 
though public, would never be observed by a stranger in their entirety.
232
  
Instead, the degree of monitoring and scope of information collected was 
only possible by technological means.
233
  Further, the unique, thorough 
compilation of electronic data collected revealed “habits and patterns that 
mark the distinction between a day in the life and a way of life.”
234
 
The Maynard case was appealed to the Supreme Court as United 
                                                          
 229. See, e.g., Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012) 
(safeguarding access to cell phone location information).   
 230. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 
320 (2012).  The government used a mosaic theory argument to block Freedom of Information Act 
requests to computerized summaries, such as FBI “rap sheets.”  See, e.g., United States Dep’t of 
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989).  Now, that same notion 
of privacy in large compilations of public data is being used to prevent the government from 
collecting this information in the first place.  See infra notes 234–36 and accompanying text.  
 231. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012). 
 232. Id. at 560. 
 233. Id. at 562. 
 234. Id. at 558; see also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009); United States v. 
Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344–47 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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States v. Jones.
235
  There, Justice Sotomayor seemed to accept a mosaic 
theory approach to privacy in her concurrence.
236
  In particular, Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence recognized that electronic compilations of non-
private data, as a whole, deserve some sort of protection given the sheer 
scope of information they convey about the person.
237
 
The Jones majority opinion focused on whether the placement of the 
device was a search and held that an unconstitutional search occurred 
when the device was placed on the car that was parked in a private 
driveway.
238
  Notably, the majority avoided the issue of whether placing 
the device without the trespass would be constitutional.  The Court noted 
that, although visual surveillance and tailing over a four-week period 
may be constitutional, “[i]t may be that achieving the same result through 
electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an 
unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not 
require us to answer that question.”
239
 
But Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence expanded on this question and 
noted that evolving technological advancement may also alter societal 
expectations of privacy.
240
  Thus, even if no trespass or other physical 
intrusion had occurred, use of the GPS tracking device may still amount 
to a constitutional violation.
241
  Sotomayor observed that “GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s 
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about . . . familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”
242
  Compiling 
this comprehensive personal data—though not “private” data—may 
constitute an invasion of privacy when viewed in the aggregate.
243
  
Indeed, gaining access into this “quantum of intimate information about 
any person” crosses the boundaries of what may be reasonable.
244
  Thus, 
Sotomayor called into question the lack of reasonable expectations of 
privacy to aggregated public data, noting that she would “ask whether 
people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and 
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more 
                                                          
 235. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 236. Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 950–53 (majority opinion).  
 239. Id. at 954. 
 240. See id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 241. Id. at 955. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 955–56; see also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009); United 
States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344–47 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 244. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956. 
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Sotomayor also took into consideration the fact that this aggregate of 
data may be voluntarily communicated to third parties and called for a 
rethinking of the third-party disclosure rule: “More fundamentally, it 
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 




The mosaic theory may be difficult to apply in the Fourth 
Amendment context.  For example, Professor Orin Kerr has identified 
serious limitations and challenges of applying the mosaic theory to 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure requirements.
247
  In particular, 
Fourth Amendment law has always hinged on viewing each step 
individually—sequentially and scene-by-scene—to determine if a search 
occurred as to a particular act.
248
  In contrast, mosaic theory looks at the 
entirety of numerous individual acts retrospectively to determine if the 
surveillance as a whole constitutes a search.
249
  The departure from the 
scene-by-scene analysis requires a post hoc reexamination of activity 
that, individually, may have passed constitutional muster.  Further, no 
standard of reasonableness exists as to mosaic searches, no remedies 
have been defined, and no guidance exists as to permissible durations 
and scales of mosaic searches.  Thus, the practical implication is that law 
enforcement is given little guidance as to when lawful activity morphs 
into an unconstitutional “mosaic” search and may struggle in applying 
this new, unprecedented mosaic approach.
250
 
Despite these criticisms, mosaic theory can be a tool when looking at 
whether an existing digital data compilation should be handed over in 
civil discovery.  At the very least, this theory, by analogy, can support a 
more limited production and disaggregation of data, in an effort to 
                                                          
 245. Id.; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 
957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
 246. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957; Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199; Graham, 796 F.3d at 344–47; but see 
In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 247. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory, supra note 230, at 346–50. 
 248. Id. at 315–17 (Kerr refers to this as “sequential” approach). 
 249. Id. at 313. 
 250. Id. at 344.  Although Professor Kerr argues against a mosaic theory approach to the Fourth 
Amendment, he nonetheless notes that traditional privacy doctrines have been outpaced by new 
technology: “[c]hanging technology can outpace the assumptions of existing precedents, and courts 
may need to tweak prior doctrine to restore the balance of privacy protection from an earlier age.”  
Id. (noting that longstanding methods of interpreting the Fourth Amendment already include 
“equilibrium-adjustment” in the wake of shifting societal needs). 
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mitigate some of these privacy concerns. 
B. Privacy’s Role in Civil Discovery 
The constitutional and statutory principles that provide a framework 
of privacy law in the U.S. do not expressly limit civil discovery under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Indeed, the Fourth Amendment 
protects against government intrusion into private spaces, and civil 
discovery among private parties is not limited by the Fourth Amendment 
per se.
251
  Nonetheless, some scholars maintain that the Fourth 
Amendment should be an express limit or (at the very least) guiding 
principle for court-ordered discovery in civil cases.
252
  Several courts 
already look to broader constitutional principles when exercising their 
discretion in civil matters, noting that discovery, if proper, also comports 
with constitutional protections.
253
  Most notably, privacy-based 
arguments are being made in a variety of civil cases, and courts 
analogize to Fourth Amendment or other privacy concepts when 
resolving discovery disputes.
254
  Thus, general privacy law principles are 
important for crafting meaningful boundaries in the civil discovery 
context.  Several parallels can be drawn between the principles 
underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and privacy law and, by 
recognizing the intersection of these two areas of law, courts can revive 
or expand important privacy-based limits on civil discovery. 
1. Established Categories of Privacy Protection in Civil Discovery 
Overly broad civil discovery violates certain implied rights of the 
party or witness that draw on broader privacy concepts, such as the right 
to be free from harassment and embarrassment.
255
  But as a general 
                                                          
 251. See, e.g., Doe v. Senechal, 725 N.E.2d 225, 231 (Mass. 2000) (noting that Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to civil litigation among private parties); Jeana K. Reinbold, Reconciling 
a Debtor’s Right to Privacy with a Chapter 7 Trustee’s Duties, 33-OCT AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 18 
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 252. Chad DeVeaux, A Tale of Two Searches: Intrusive Civil Discovery Rules Violate the Fourth 
Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1104 (2014) (proposing that Fourth Amendment applies to 
court-ordered civil discovery); see also Jordana Cooper, Beyond Judicial Discretion: Toward a 
Rights-Based Theory of Civil Discovery and Protective Orders, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 775, 776 (2005). 
 253. See, e.g., Ambassador Coll. v. Goetzke, 260 S.E.2d 27, 29–30 (Ga. 1979) (Hill, J., 
concurring); Grober v. Dep’t of Revenue, 956 P.2d 1230, 1234 n.8 (Alaska 1998); Shira A. 
Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the 
Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 350 (2000). 
 254. See, e.g., Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 255. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
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matter, the discovery rules permit broad discovery with little 
differentiation between public and private content.  As noted by the 
Supreme Court in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart,
256
 
[t]he rules do not differentiate between information that is private or 
intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach.  Under the Rules, 
the only express limitations are that the information sought is not 
privileged, and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.  
Thus, the Rules often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both 
litigants and third parties.
257
 
Nonetheless, some privacy-protection tools already exist within the 
rules, and the rules as a whole contemplate broad discretion by courts. 
Although litigants may seek out all relevant information,
258
 discovery 
requests cannot create undue burden, embarrassment, or harassment.
259
  
Courts do not allow fishing expeditions that demand broad and 
unfettered access to data and documents without regard to its 
relevance.
260
  Discovery should be used to find details, not to cast a wide 
net to fish for potential claims.
261
  As a result, discovery requests must be 
specific and stated with reasonable particularity, and the need for 
discovery must be balanced against the burden or embarrassment that 
producing it creates.
262
  These limits—particularly those based on notions 
of harassment, embarrassment, and burden—imply a privacy-related 
right that should not be infringed upon through overly broad discovery. 
Therefore, courts have the power and discretion to limit the scope of 
discovery itself.  Even though relevant information is generally 
discoverable, courts can disallow discovery of even relevant information 
when countervailing concerns warrant such a limit.  Thus, information 
that is otherwise relevant may still be excluded altogether from 
discovery, thereby protecting broader categories of data from any 
                                                          
 256. 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
 257. Id. at 30. 
 258. See id. 
 259. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory 
committee’s notes (1970 Amendments). 
 260. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (dismissing a complaint to 
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In addition to the court’s discretion to define the scope of discovery, 
the Federal Rules have also been limited by express privacy protection, 
such as through the work product doctrine and the attorney-client 
privilege.
264





 have also been shielded from discovery on privacy 
grounds. 
Once private information is deemed to be within the scope of 
discovery, courts have multiple options to help protect privacy or 
confidentiality, including in camera review, the sealing of documents, 
and redaction of personal information.
267
  Protective orders are an 
important mechanism for protecting privacy.
268
  Rule 26(c) expressly 
permits courts to use protective orders in the discovery process, both as 
“‘blanket’ protective orders” covering a broad swath of information in 
the litigation or narrow protective orders as to particular materials.
269
  
Although open disclosure of court records is an important consideration, 
that access must be balanced against individual privacy interests.
270
  
Protective orders thus “recognize that parties engaged in litigation do not 
sacrifice all aspects of privacy or their proprietary information simply 
because of a lawsuit”
271
 and provide a modicum of privacy protection.  
Nonetheless, alleging privacy interests, without more, will not suffice to 
establish good cause for obtaining a protective order.
272
 
Privacy-based limits are already built into the existing civil discovery 
process, and the renewed emphasis on proportionality further highlights 
the courts’ ability to limit discovery.  Throughout the history of the 
                                                          
 263.  Crawford–El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998).   
 264. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 499 (1947); see also Bahadur, supra note 112 (describing 
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 265. See, e.g., Wiesenberger v. W. E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
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 268. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984). 
 269. See United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 270. In re Mirapex Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.R.D. 668, 673 (D. Minn. 2007). 
 271. Id. 
 272. See, e.g., Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 481 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (good 
cause not established when defendant bank made conclusory assertion that its employees would be 
harmed without a protective order). 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an implicit tension between open 
access to information and privacy existed.  This tension continues to 
exist today as courts grapple with large swaths of data that, in the 
aggregate, reveal unprecedented amounts of personal information about 
people.  Evolving notions of privacy, particular as to aggregated digital 
data compilations, may help courts fashion fair limits on overly intrusive 
discovery.  To date, however, few cases rely on privacy-based 
considerations as a factor in determining the scope of civil discovery of 
digital data compilations. 
2. Social Media Discovery 
Social media accounts are a primary example of cases where litigants 
rely on privacy-based arguments to combat overly broad discovery. But 
courts have taken inconsistent and at times unfair approaches to 
discovery of social media content, giving little credence to privacy-based 
limits to discovery. 
Although social media data is a form of ESI, the 2006 amendments 
addressing ESI discovery predate the social media boom.  In the same 
year the 2006 amendments were made, Twitter was founded; Facebook 
first expanded beyond college campuses; and MySpace was the industry 
leader (though MySpace was only three years old at the time).  Needless 
to say, social media’s popularity, functionality, and ubiquity has grown 
in unprecedented ways since 2006, and it is safe to assume that the ESI 
discovery amendments did not specifically consider social media and its 
unique ability to compile detailed personal information.  Courts seem to 
struggle with finding a fair, consistent approach to social media 
discovery and wholly reject most privacy concerns.  The result is broad 
social media discovery in many cases. 
a. Different Approaches to Social Media Discovery Generally 
A social media account, like Facebook, contains highly detailed 
personal information, archived and aggregated over time.  Generally, 
courts take three predominant approaches to social media discovery: (1) 
a “factual predicate” approach that looks to what the public account 
content shows before granting access to privacy-protected contents; (2) a 
presumption of complete discovery with few limits; or (3) a “reasonable 
particularity” approach that tries to narrow discovery to specific claims 
and issues in the litigation. 
First, under a “factual predicate” approach, courts require the party 
seeking discovery to show a factual predicate based on publicly available 
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social media data before allowing access to any private content.
273
  In 
other words, courts will deny access to any social media content without 
the party seeking discovery showing a publicly available post that 
establishes a factual predicate. 
For example, in Romano v. Steelcase Inc. the court allowed broad 
discovery of the plaintiff’s Facebook page after she alleged that she 
suffered debilitating neck and back injuries and loss of enjoyment in life 
from an injury caused by defendant’s faulty chair.
274
  The plaintiff had a 
profile photo on Facebook in which she was smiling on vacation in 
Florida that was visible to the public—including to opposing counsel.
275
  
The photo clearly contradicted her claim that she could not leave the 
house and engage in any physical activity, and defense counsel used it as 
factual predicate to support discovery of the private portions of the 
Facebook page.
276
  Specifically, defendants requested “authorizations to 
obtain full access to and copies of Plaintiff’s current and historical 
records/information on her Facebook and MySpace accounts.”
277
  The 
court allowed the defendant’s complete request and permitted discovery 
of current and prior (even deleted) items on the private portions of the 
plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace pages under state rules that parallel 
the Federal Rules.
278
  The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claim placed 
her physical condition, as well as her enjoyment of life, at issue in the 
litigation, therefore broad social media discovery was warranted.
279
  No 
limits based on the relevance of particular posts or as to date ranges were 
included in the court’s order.
280
 
In contrast, another court in a similar case disallowed all social 
media discovery under the factual predicate approach.
281
  In Tompkins v. 
Detroit Metropolitan Airport, the plaintiff alleged physical injuries from 
a slip-and-fall accident at the Detroit airport, claiming loss of enjoyment 
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 274. Id. at 653. 
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2015] PROPORTIONAL PRIVACY IN CIVIL DISCOVERY 275 
of life among other injuries.
282
  The defendant sought discovery of the 
private portions of the plaintiff’s Facebook page, relying on plaintiff’s 
public postings that showed her standing with friends at a birthday party 
while holding a small dog.
283
  The court rejected the discovery requests 
under the Romano approach.
284
  Specifically, the court noted that plaintiff 
never claimed to be unable to engage in all physical activity, and 
standing at a party and holding a small dog (which the court opined must 
weigh less than five pounds) did not undermine plaintiff’s injury 
claims.
285
  The court even noted that, while public photos of the plaintiff 
golfing or horseback riding might have created a factual predicate, the 
less rigorous activities depicted in the actual photos did not.
286
  Thus, the 




This factual predicate approach places too great an emphasis on what 
the user chose to leave public.  It ignores the fact that, even without 
publically visible content, the privacy-setting protected material may still 
be highly relevant.
288
  On the other hand, the factual predicate approach 
also may lead to overly broad access to private content once the factual 
predicate has been established.  In some cases, courts have granted 
“complete and unfettered access” to the entire account without 
establishing any parameters on what must be produced.
289
  Thus, a single 
public photo may throw open the doors to an entire Facebook account, 
for example.  As a whole, the factual predicate approach results in 
inconsistent or unfair results.
290
 
Second, some courts seem to employ a presumption of complete 
discovery of all social media contents and create few, if any, limits on 
what must be produced.  In some instances, courts even order litigants to 
produce or exchange their login and password information, thus granting 
broad and unrestricted access to everything in the social media 
                                                          
 282. Id. at 387. 
 283. Id. at 388–89.  The defendant also relied on a surveillance video of the plaintiff pushing a 
shopping cart.  Id. at 389. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 388–89. 
 286. Id. at 389. 
 287. Id. at 387. 
 288. See id.; see also Agnieszka A. McPeak, The Facebook Digital Footprint: Paving Fair and 
Consistent Pathways to Civil Discovery of Social Media Data, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 887–
88 (2013) (criticizing different approaches courts take to social media discovery). 
 289. McPeak, supra note 288, at 928. 
 290. Id. at 887–88. 
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account.
291
  Password exchanges are particularly disturbing because they 
can impact third-party rights, such as allowing the opposing counsel to 
see the “friend-only” content for the account holder’s contacts or 
receiving real-time, irrelevant content in a live stream.
292
 
Courts taking this complete-access approach seem to make no 
attempts to define the scope of relevant data in social media accounts.  
For example, in Gallion v. Gallion, a family law case,
293
 the court 
ordered counsel to exchange their clients’ passwords for Facebook and 
dating websites, apparently because the husband suspected that his wife 
made comments relevant to her feelings for their children and to 
infidelity on the social media sites.
294
  Again, the court created no limits 
on what data within the accounts was discoverable.
295
 
Similarly, in McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc.,
296
 the court 
ordered the plaintiff, a racecar driver, to hand over his MySpace and 
Facebook passwords to defense counsel in his personal injury suit after 
only a minimal relevance showing.
297
  In that case, defendants were 
granted broad discovery of the social media accounts because the public 
portions of the account showed the plaintiff fishing and attending a 
Daytona 500 race.
298
  The court did not address whether these activities 
directly contradict plaintiff’s injury claims but noted that the plaintiff 




These cases illustrate how, under this second, complete-access 
approach, courts allow unfettered review of all of the social media 
                                                          
 291. Id. at 887.   
 292. For example, Facebook’s policies prohibit disclosing one’s password to anyone else.  See 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2015); see also Brian Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the 
Government’s Use of Cell Tower Dumps In Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 17 
(noting how cell-site location information implicates third-party privacy rights). 
 293. No. FA114116955S, 2011 WL 4953451 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 294. Id. at *1; see also Kashmir Hill, Judge Orders Divorcing Couple to Swap Facebook and 
Dating Site Passwords, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2011, 9:42 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/11/07/judge-orders-divorcing-couple-to-swap-
facebook-and-dating-site-passwords/. 
 295. Gallion, 2011 WL 4953451, at *1 (modifying its order to clarify that only counsel and not 
the parties themselves may receive the other’s password, and neither party may post messages 
pretending to be the other). 
 296. No. 113–2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010) (granting motion to 
compel under state rules that mirror the Federal Rules). 
 297. Id. at *4; see also Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688, at *7 (Pa.  Ct. Com. 
Pl. Nov. 8, 2011). 
 298. McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *4. 
 299. Id. at *3–4. 
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account contents after little or no relevance showing.  This approach 
likely encompasses data that is not only irrelevant but otherwise wholly 
unrelated to the claims and issues in the litigation.
300
  Forced password 
disclosures also impact third-party rights and provide overly intrusive 
aspects to all facets of a live social media account. 
Third, under a “reasonable particularity” approach, courts attempt to 
define the scope of discovery based on the specificity of the discovery 
request and the potential relevance of the information sought.
301
  This 
approach tries to create more meaningful limits based on the reasonable 
particularity of the request, but courts still struggle with drawing 
meaningful boundaries.
302
  Nonetheless, under this approach, courts tend 




Some courts using the reasonable particularity approach make more 
of an effort to define what is relevant in a social media account.  For 
example, in EEOC v. Simply Storage Management
304
 the court held that 
data marked private on social media websites is nonetheless discoverable 
if it may be relevant to a claim or defense.
305
  That case involved an 
employment discrimination suit in which plaintiffs claimed they were 
victims of sexual harassment and sex discrimination.
306
  The defendants 
sought broad discovery of plaintiffs’ social media pages, including all 
photographs or videos and copies of complete profiles, and certain third-
party app information.
307
  The court noted that the Federal Rules support 
broad discovery and encompass all relevant data, regardless of the form 
                                                          
 300. Scholars have criticized the broad and unfettered access courts give litigants to social media 
accounts.  See, e.g., Bruce E. Boyden, Oversharing: Facebook Discovery and the Unbearable 
Sameness of Internet Law, 65 ARK. L. REV. 39, 58–59 (2012) (asserting that such broad access is 
inconsistent with the rules of civil procedure and invades privacy without sufficient cause); Aviva 
Orenstein, Friends, Gangbangers, Custody Disputants, Lend Me Your Passwords, 31 MISS. C. L. 
REV. 185, 223–24 (2012) (recommending a rebuttable presumption regarding the authenticity of 
social media accounts when litigants are asked to hand over passwords). 
 301. See, e.g., EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. 430, 434–35 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
 302. Id. at 434. 
 303. Id.  
 304. Id. at 430. 
 305. Id. at 434. 
 306. Id. at 432. 
 307. Id. (explaining that defendants specifically sought “[a]ll photographs or videos posted by 
[plaintiffs] or anyone on [their] behalf on Facebook or MySpace from April 23, 2007 to present” as 
well as copies of plaintiffs’ “complete profile on Facebook and MySpace (including all updates, 
changes, or modifications to [the] profile[s]) and all status updates, messages, wall comments, 
causes joined, groups joined, activity streams, blog entries, details, blurbs, comments, and 
applications (including, but not limited to, ‘How well do you know me’ and the ‘Naughty 
Application’) for the period from April 23, 2007 to the present”).   
278 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
that data takes.
308
  The court also recognized that discovery is subject to 
some limits and cannot be unreasonably cumulative, duplicative, 
burdensome, or expensive.
309
  It noted that these limits must be balanced 
against “the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”
310
 
With this general framework in mind, the court in Simply Storage 
applied the basic principles of discovery to social media content.
311
  It 
clarified that “the simple fact that a claimant has had social 
communications is not necessarily probative of the particular mental and 
emotional health matters at issue in the case.”
312
  Instead, only limited 
social media content can be sought, even though severe emotional 
distress is alleged.
313
  The court analogized “private” social media 
content to email and noted that only those communications that are 
relevant should be produced.
314
  But ultimately, the court articulated the 
scope of relevant discovery in very broad terms: 
[A]ny profiles, postings, or messages (including status updates, wall 
comments, causes joined, groups joined, activity streams, blog entries) 
and [social networking site] applications for [plaintiffs] for the period 
from [date of incident], through the present that reveal, refer, or relate 
to any emotion, feeling, or mental state, as well as communications that 
reveal, refer, or relate to events that could reasonably be expected to 
produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental state.
315
 
Thus, although the Simply Storage court refused to allow disclosure 
of an entire social media account, it also drew a wide net of what content 
is discoverable under the relevance standard.
316
  The resulting order 
                                                          
 308. Id. at 433 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26).  
 309. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)). 
 310. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)). 
 311. Id. at 434. 
 312. Id. at 435. 
 313. Id. at 435–36 (explaining that “[a]llegations of depression, stress disorders, and like injuries 
do not automatically render all SNS communications relevant”). 
 314. Id. at 435. 
 315. Id. at 436.  
 316. Id. at 434–36 (stating that social networking site content is not shielded from discovery just 
because it is “locked” or “private” and that such content must be produced when it is relevant to a 
claim or defense in the case); see also Caputi v. Topper Realty Corp., No. 14-CV-2634, 2015 WL 
893663, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2015) (“the Court . . . declines to give Defendants complete access 
to Plaintiff’s Facebook account for the purpose of identifying photographs, postings or private 
messages that may appear inconsistent with someone experiencing emotional distress.  Rather, 
Defendants are entitled to a sampling of Plaintiff’s Facebook activity for the period November 2011 
to November 2013, limited to any ‘specific references to the emotional distress [Plaintiff] claims she 
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remains very broad, and the court noted that it cannot draw boundaries in 
the level of specificity that the litigants would desire.
317
  Indeed, because 
social media contains so much personal information, broad discovery 
requests for social media account data often touch upon issues in the 
litigation—from piecing together facts to impeachment evidence and 
proof of damages. 
Because discovery requests for social media content often meet a 
basic standard of relevance,
318
 the court in Simply Storage attempted to 
create a more meaningful, narrow scope of discovery.
319
  Specifically, 
the court limited its holding to cases involving more than “garden variety 
emotional distress claims,”
320
 as the analysis hinged instead on 
allegations of “severe emotional distress, including post-traumatic stress 
disorder.”
321
  Despite the court’s attempt to limit broad discovery to cases 
of severe emotional distress, other cases involving “garden variety 




Taken as a whole, the cases addressing social media discovery take 
an inconsistent and often times broad approach that often results in 
complete access to a social media account.  Some courts make little 
effort to create meaningful boundaries and instead allow, without 
adequate justification, whole-cloth discovery in many cases. 
b. Privacy Arguments in Social Media Discovery Cases 
Regardless of which approach courts take to social media discovery, 
the cases often reject privacy-based arguments as a limit to social media 
discovery.  Instead, courts emphasize that social media accounts cannot 
                                                          
suffered’ in the Complaint, and any ‘treatment she received in connection [there]with.’”). 
 317. Id. at 436. 
 318. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  The 2015 amendments will modify this rule to define the scope of 
discovery as information “relevant to any party’s claim or defense and [is] proportional to the needs 
of the case.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015 Prospective Amendments).  Nonetheless, even under the 
revised rule, social media content will often meet the relevance standard. 
 319. Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. at 434. 
 320. Id. at 437. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See, e.g., Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 571–73 (C.D. Cal. 2012) 
(severe emotional distress claim warranted broad social media discovery but included a limit based 
on a relevant time period); Robinson v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00127-PK, 2012 
WL 3763545, at *1–2 (D. Or. Aug. 29, 2012) (social media discovery limited to content that reflects 
“work-related emotions”); Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, No. CV 2012–0307 (ILG) (MDG), 2012 
WL 6720752, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012) (allowing discovery as broad as that in Simply 
Storage but apparently without allegations of severe emotional distress). 
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be protected as “private” by the very nature of this new medium.
323
  
Further, the privacy controls on social media websites are complicated, 
unreliable, and ever-changing, making it difficult to create meaningful 




Many privacy-based arguments usually fail in social media discovery 
cases.  First, some litigants have argued for a “social network site 
privilege” or exception, which understandably has been flatly rejected by 
courts.
325
  It is clear that no “social network site privilege” should exist, 
and several courts expressly hold that social media cannot be subject to 
any sort of privilege as an exception to discoverability.
326
  In McMillen, a 
Pennsylvania court rejected arguments that some form of “social network 
site privilege” should be created to protect confidential and private 
messages sent through Facebook.
327
  According to the McMillen court, 
social networking websites may be used by some people to convey 
confidential and personal information to another user, but any 
expectation to privacy in such communications is unreasonable due to 
the very nature and purpose of these websites.
328
  Further, the user who 
receives a communication via a social media account can easily 
disseminate it to others, which also deteriorates the private nature of the 
communication.
329
  The McMillen court quoted Facebook’s own privacy 
policy to emphasize further the lack of privacy protections guaranteed by 
the site
330
 and noted that, if users want to keep communications private, 
they should have chosen another form of communication.
331
  But like 
many other decisions, the McMillen court failed to make any distinction 
between Friends-only posts and direct one-on-one communications via 
                                                          
 323. Social media websites exist to share, and sites like Facebook make clear in their terms that 
they are designed to facilitate connections and sharing with others. See About Facebook, supra note 
205. 
 324. See Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (stating the Facebook user “will not share your password (or 
in the case of developers, your secret key), let anyone else access your account, or do anything else 
that might jeopardize the security of your account”); see McPeak, supra note 288. 
 325. See, e.g., McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113–2010 CD, 2010 WL 
4403285, at *4 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010); Trail v. Lesko, No. GD-10-017249, 2012 WL 
2864004 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. July 3, 2012). 
 326. See McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285 at *4.  
 327. Id. at *3. 
 328. Id. at *2. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at *2–3. 
 331. Id. at *3–4 (“[N]o person choosing MySpace or Facebook as a communications forum 
could reasonably expect that his communications would remain confidential, as both sites clearly 
express the possibility of disclosure.”). 
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the messaging or chat features, nor did it consider the full scope of data 
available via a social media account.  Ultimately, the court ordered the 




Other privacy-based concerns have also been rejected by courts.  In 
Romano, for example, the plaintiff argued that private social media data 
should be afforded some protection from discovery.
333
  The court 
expressly looked to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, noting that an 
email or other writing is not private once shared with another person.
334
  
Thus, the expectation of privacy is not reasonable once information is 
transmitted to others.
335
  The Romano court noted that social media 
websites exist to facilitate sharing, and a plaintiff cannot be allowed to 
hide behind self-selected privacy settings to shield otherwise 
discoverable information from the defendant.
336
 
In general, courts lump all social media together and rely heavily on 
the simple definition of social media as a tool for sharing and not 
secrecy.
337
  However, in Trail v. Lesko, the court acknowledged that 
granting a party broad access to the private portion of a social media 
account is intrusive and can result in access to a great deal of personal 
information that is unrelated to the litigation.
338
  Further, the court noted 
that a state rule of procedure prevented discovery that may be 
embarrassing, such as social media content.
339
  Nonetheless, the court 
reasoned that the intrusiveness that results is minimal, given that the 
account-holder already chose to share social media information 
voluntarily with numerous Friends.
340
  Thus, the court held that when 
discovery is likely to yield relevant information that is not available 
                                                          
 332. Id. at *4; see also Trail v. Lesko, No. GD-10-017249, 2012 WL 2864004 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
July 3, 2012) (rejecting social media privilege argument because no “constitutional right to privacy 
or any common law or statutory privileges” apply). 
 333. Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651–52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 334. Id. at 655–56.  
 335. Id. at 656 (“Users would logically lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in materials 
intended for . . . public posting.  They would lose a legitimate expectation of privacy in an e-mail 
that had already reached its recipient . . . the e-mailer would be analogous to a letter-writer whose 
expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery . . . .” (quoting United States v. Lifshitz, 
369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004))). 
 336. Id. at 655. 
 337. See id. at 653–54. 
 338. Trail v. Lesko, No. GD-10-017249, 2012 WL 2864004, at *28–29 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. July 3, 
2012). 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 29 (“[O]n a scale of 1 (the lowest) to 10 (the greatest), the intrusion from most 
Facebook discovery is probably at a level of 2.”). 
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elsewhere, the intrusion posed is not unreasonable.
341
 
Other cases give some consideration to privacy-based concerns.  In 
Appler v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, the plaintiff in an employment case 
requested the complete download file from Facebook for two of 
defendants’ employees.  The court noted that the broad request for the 
entire download file, which includes content not available to the public, 
implicates privacy interests.
342
  Thus, the court acknowledged that even 
private social media content is discoverable, but limited discovery to 
content that is relevant to plaintiff’s mental and emotional states, which 
are factual issues in the litigation.
343
  Notably, the court balanced the 
relevancy of the requested discovery against the privacy burden, and 
concluded that limited social media discovery of defendants’ employees’ 
Facebook pages is permissible.
344
 
These cases, for the most part, give little consideration to the fact 
that privacy settings create some distinction between public and private 
content, which may affect how users perceive their intended 
audiences.
345
  But under many cases addressing social media civil 
discovery issues, the user’s desired level of sharing means very little, and 
broad discovery of social media data appears to be common.  The current 
case law on social media discovery does not adapt privacy considerations 
to the changing nature of our online activity.
346
 
3. Smartphone Discovery 
Smartphones and similar computing devices serve a dual personal 
and professional purpose for many users, especially in light of the rise of 
BYOD policies at workplaces.  The result is that personal and 
professional content is comingled on one personally-owned device.  The 
effect of this commingling may be profound: employers must determine 
how they control and back up professional data on personal devices in 
                                                          
 341. Id. 
 342. Appler v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, No. 3:14-CV-166-RLY-WGH, 2015 WL 5615038, at 
*4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2015). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id.; see also Nucci v. Target Corp., 162 So. 3d 146, 153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (allowing 
broad discovery of Plaintiff’s Facebook photographs because she “has but a limited privacy interest, 
if any, in pictures posted on her social networking sites.”). 
 345. See United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 346. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also Solove, supra note 162; 
Bryce Clayton Newell, Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Online Social Networks, 
17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12 (2011) (comparative examination of different privacy schemes in relation 
to social media).  
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order to collect and preserve content for litigation purposes.
347
  
Additionally, discovery of content on these devices may encompass 
irrelevant, highly personal information of both litigants and employees 
who are not parties to the litigation. 
As a starting point, content contained on personal devices generally 
is not beyond the scope of discovery in a business dispute.  Rather, 
employers may be under a duty to preserve and produce relevant 
information that exists on employees’ personal devices when used for a 
work-related purpose.  In Passlogix, Inc. v. 2FA Technologies, LLC
348
 
the defendant was sanctioned for failing to preserve 143 written 
communications made on an employee’s personal device, including 
emails, text messages, and Skype messages.
349
  The court held that the 
communications were relevant to the breach of contract claim at issue 
and rejected defendant’s argument that it was under no duty to preserve 
communications that occurred on an employee’s personal device.
350
  




Even though smartphone contents are discoverable, courts give some 
consideration to confidentiality and privacy concerns.  For example, in 
Bakhit v. Safety Marking, Inc.
352
 the court looked at a request to image 
and retrieve data from a cell phone, including phone call and text records 
in an employment discrimination case.
353
  There, the court noted that the 
scope of discovery includes a right to electronically stored information, 
but that this right is ‘“counterbalanced by a responding party’s 
confidentiality or privacy interests.’”
354
  Direct access to records of this 
nature is not granted as a matter of course, and the requesting party must 
provide adequate justification for the discovery sought.
355
  Thus, the 
court in Bakhit rejected the request, even though it sought relevant 
                                                          
 347. See The Sedona Conference®, Commentary, The Sedona Conference® Commentary on 
Information Governance, 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 125, 129 (Conor R. Crowley et al. eds.) (2014). 
 348. 708 F. Supp. 2d 378, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Secs., 685 F. 
Supp. 2d 456, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) abrogated on other grounds by Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & 
N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012) (employer had duty to produce emails and documents on employee 
personal devices); Koosharem Corp. v. Spec Pers., LLC, No. 6:08-583-HFF-WMC, 2008 WL 
4458864, *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008) (same). 
 352. Civ. No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2014 WL 2916490 (D. Conn. June 26, 2014). 
 353. Id. at *1. 
 354. Id. at *2 (quoting Genworth Fin. Wealth Mgmt., Inc. v. McMullan, 267 F.R.D. 443, 446 (D. 
Conn. 2010)). 
 355. Id. 
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content: “[a]lthough the information plaintiffs seek may be relevant to 
their claims, on the current record, the Court finds that the request as 
framed is overly broad and too intrusive for this stage of discovery.”
356
  
The court further supported its decision by citing to Riley and “[t]he 
implication of the individual defendants’ privacy interest in the data 
stored on their cell phone.”
357
  As a result, discovery of potentially 
relevant cell phone content was denied due in part to the privacy 
concerns such broad discovery raises. 
Other courts tackling these novel challenges also seem to recognize 
the privacy implications of broad personal device discovery.  For 
example, in Han v. Futurewei Technologies, Inc.
358
 the court considered 
a motion to compel a broad search of a former employee’s personal 
computing device in her employment discrimination claim.
359
  During the 
initial disclosure phase of the litigation, the employer-defendant’s 
computer forensics firm discovered that the plaintiff copied, removed, 
and deleted files from a company-issued laptop.
360
  As a result, the 
employer-defendant suspected theft of confidential and proprietary 




Even though the employer-defendant in Han had not filed a 
counterclaim yet, it sought broad, expedited discovery of all content on 
plaintiff’s personal computers and devices.
362
  As part of the discovery 
attempt, the employer-defendant suggested a protocol involving a 
forensic firm imaging and capturing all of plaintiff’s personal computer 
content for search-term review and other analysis.
363
  The plaintiff 
objected to this broad discovery, noting that “her personal computer 
contains attorney-client privileged communications, attorney work 
product, and information in which she has a strong privacy interest, 
including correspondence with friends and family, online banking 
information, and other private data and passwords.”
364
  The court found 
that the requested discovery was not necessary or justified, as the 
employer-defendant had not established that the plaintiff was acting 
                                                          
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. at *3. 
 358. No. 11-CV-831-JM (JMA), 2011 WL 4344301 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2011). 
 359. Id. at *1. 
 360. Id.  
 361. Id. at *1, *4. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. at *1–2. 
 364. Id. at *2. 
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maliciously or at risk of destroying evidence.
365
  Nor could the employer-
defendant point to a policy that prohibited the transfer or deletion of 
company content from work or personal devices.
366
  Instead, the court 
noted that the plaintiff may have been merely “cleaning up” a work 
laptop when she returned it after transferring or deleting work-related 
material.
367
  Thus, the employer-defendant failed to support its broad 
discovery attempts as to personal computers that may store work-related 
data.
368
  Additionally, the court expressed concern over the potential 
access to privileged or private content on the employee’s personal 




As more employers adopt BYOD policies, business disputes will 
involve broad attempts at discovery of smartphone or other personal 
device contents.  While these devices are not shielded from discovery, 
the scope of discovery must account for the unique privacy implications 
that arise because of the comingling of personal and professional data.  
Further, smartphones and personal devices will continue to expand in 
functionality and will archive even more highly personal details over 
time, making broad attempts at civil discovery even more intrusive.  
Courts will have to weigh privacy concerns when defining discovery’s 
parameters. 
V. DEVELOPING PRIVACY-BASED LIMITS TO CIVIL DISCOVERY OF 
DIGITAL DATA COMPILATIONS 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, throughout their evolution, 
have struggled to balance open access to information with countervailing 
concerns that are rooted in privacy-based principles.  At the same time, 
privacy law as a whole struggles to adapt to the quickly-evolving 
technological landscape.  As our capacity to create, store, and access vast 
archives of personal information increases, the law’s ability to cope with 
                                                          
 365. Id. at *6.  
 366. Id. at *4. 
 367. Id.  
 368. Id.  
 369. Id. at *5; see also In re Petition of John W. Danforth Grp., Inc., No. 13-MC-33S, 2013 WL 
3324017, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (denying request to copy contents of plaintiff’s personal 
smartphone in employment discrimination case under FED. R. CIV. P. 27 because there was 
insufficient showing that the evidence would otherwise be destroyed or lost before Rule 26 
discovery commenced); see also Redgrave, supra note 154 at 41–42 (discussing at least seven 
factors courts consider when weighing individual privacy concerns in electronic communication files 
against an organization’s legitimate business interests).  
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novel privacy implications decreases.  The result is incomplete protection 
against new privacy harms, particularly in the context of civil discovery. 
As digital data compilation, storage, and access evolves, the 
underlying principles of civil discovery nonetheless form a solid 
foundation for balancing privacy concerns against the need for open 
access to information in an adversarial civil litigation system.  The 
existing rules, particularly with the 2015 amendments, already provide 
the mechanisms by which to unearth the limiting principles necessary for 
recalibrating the scope of discovery.  Courts already have the discretion 
to limit the scope of discovery based on the needs of the case and should 
utilize the proportionality test in Rule 26 to balance the privacy burden of 
overly invasive discovery against the needs of the case.  Through the 
proportionality test, balance can be achieved, and the rules will not be 
outpaced by technological change. 
A. Privacy-Based Considerations Are Necessary and Proper 
Privacy-based limits on civil discovery of large digital data 
compilations are necessary to protect individuals from being forced to 
hand over the thorough archive of their lives contained in the private 
portion of a social media account or on a smartphone.  Although 
individual content alone may not be “private,” the aggregate of data—as 
a whole—is too broad and detailed to warrant complete discovery in 
many cases.  In essence, the data contained in these digital compilations, 
when viewed together, paint a detailed mosaic of one’s personal life.  
Access to the entire mosaic should not be granted without adequate 
justification. 
Throughout its history, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have 
balanced the need for open access to information against countervailing 
limiting principles that, in essence, are rooted in notions of privacy.  
Even at the time of the rules’ adoption, critics noted the intrusiveness of 
the new discovery regime.
370
  The rules have always excluded irrelevant 
content from the ambit of discovery and shunned discovery attempts that 
harass, embarrass, or burden others.  As the rules evolved, courts 
expressly carved out specific privacy-based limits, such as attorney-work 
product or protection of trade secrets.  It is within this framework—of 
striving for a balance between access and privacy protection—that the 
rules continue to grow and evolve through the 2015 amendments. 
Even though the 1938 rules intentionally opened up otherwise 
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personal information to discovery in civil litigation, no one at that time 
could have anticipated the vast scope of data that would be accessed in 
modern cases.
371
  Electronically stored information, in general, can 
involve millions of pages of emails, documents, files, and other 
information.  Social media accounts offer multiple functions and 
aggregate daily activity over time.  Smartphones, as noted in the Riley 
case, hold more personal information than an individual could ever carry 
with them in non-digital form.
372
  Quite simply, the world of information 
has changed.  And civil discovery once again must strike a balance. 
The 2006 amendments, in addressing ESI specifically, recognized 
the need for meaningful limits on electronic discovery due to the sheer 
volume of data now available.  Although critics and scholars differ about 
the actual costs and burdens of discovery,
373
 the rules nonetheless have 
responded to the digital age by accounting for the impact of large digital 
archives of information.  Now, the 2015 amendments to Rule 26 signal a 
renewed emphasis on proportionality and striking a balance: discovery, 
at its core, must be proportional to the needs of the case. 
At the same time, privacy law in general struggles to adapt to the 
boom of digital information and its implications on individual privacy 
rights.  While no comprehensive privacy protection exists for social 
media accounts and personal data on smartphones, privacy law 
nonetheless is trending towards protecting digital data compilations in 
some way.  In the Fourth Amendment context, for example, some 
privacy interests have been recognized in cell phones
374
 and in privacy-
setting protected portions of social media accounts.
375
  Additionally, the 
mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment may be gaining ground as an 
additional consideration for privacy protection.  Vast digital data 
compilations may be composed of individual, non-private pieces of 
information but, when viewed in the aggregate, they paint a detailed 
picture that is highly personal and subject to some sort of privacy 
protection.  Although problematic in a Fourth Amendment context, 
mosaic theory nonetheless may be shaping some court decisions about 
privacy-based limits on GPS tracking or other electronic surveillance.
376
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As a whole, traditional privacy law principles may be evolving to adapt 
to the digital age through recognition of privacy-based protections of 
digital data compilations. 
Without question, civil discovery must allow for much broader 
intrusion into personal spheres than Fourth Amendment searches and 
seizures, for example.  Parties may inject issues into civil litigation that 
necessitate prying into private documents and electronic information.  
But like Fourth Amendment law, civil discovery rules must also account 
for the new technological landscape in which we now live.  Even though 
our civil discovery system allows for broad discovery into relevant 
matters, limits do exist.  Privacy law concepts should help define those 
limits in the digital age. 
B. The Proportionality Analysis Should Consider Privacy Burdens 
The Federal Rules have already equipped courts with the tools they 
need to craft meaningful limits to civil discovery of large digital data 
compilations, such as social media accounts and smartphone contents.  
Under the existing rules and the 2015 amendments, discovery must be 
“proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the 
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit.”
377
  Under this test, even relevant information can be excluded if 
such discovery is disproportionate.
378
 
In order to achieve proportionality, courts should (1) acknowledge 
the privacy concerns that exist with discovery of digital data 
compilations; (2) include burdens on privacy within the proportionality 
test; and (3) consider protective orders when granting broad access to 
digital data compilations. 
First, courts should recognize that a valid privacy concern exists 
when a party seeks access to a digital data compilation.  This privacy 
concern is similar to that which underlies the mosaic theory of the Fourth 
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Amendment: when viewed as a whole, a digital data compilation 
contains individual bits of information that reveal the intimate details of 
one’s thoughts, feelings, activities, associations, and public movements.  
This level of detailed information should be afforded some privacy 
protection, even though each piece of information does not fit neatly into 
traditional notions of privacy.  In other words, the mosaic painted by 
these small pieces of information should be shielded from civil discovery 
in some instances. 
Thus, courts should be mindful of the personal mosaic that is 
revealed when a party is granted access to all privacy-setting protected 
portions of a social media account or smartphone data.  Most cases do 
not justify the intrusiveness of whole-cloth disclosure of the entire digital 
data compilation.  Even though most of the individual pieces of data in 
these examples may not be considered “private” when analyzed alone, 
the aggregate of data should not be handed over until the privacy harm of 
broad discovery is considered.
379
  By recognizing the invasiveness of 
whole-cloth discovery of digital data compilations, courts can begin to 
disaggregate content and carve out appropriate boundaries for 
production. 
Second, after recognizing that broad discovery of digital data 
compilations may implicate privacy concerns, courts should take privacy 
burdens into account when determining the proportionality of discovery.  
Under the proportionality test, the “burden” of discovery usually looks to 
economic costs and financial burden.
380
  Although financial burdens are 
important, nothing in the Federal Rules limits this consideration to 
finances alone.  Indeed, a purely economic inquiry is not possible in 
many cases, as the value of the claim may be difficult to determine and 
the actual costs of the discovery is unknown.
381
  Thus, an economic-only 
approach nonetheless leads to imprecise calculations.  Further, the cost of 
storing and producing digital data compilations continues to decline, and 
companies like Facebook empower account-holders to easily access a 
downloaded version of their entire account.
382
  Structuring the law 
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around merely financial considerations would be short-cited given the 
pace at which new technology evolves. 
Additionally, the proportionality factors already look to some non-
pecuniary considerations, such as the importance of the issues at stake in 
the action.  And, as some have noted, other nonmonetary factors should 
be considered within the proportionality analysis.
383
  These factors 
necessarily involve public policy considerations, societal values, and 
other principles that cannot be easily quantified.  Therefore, courts 
already balance a variety of concerns—beyond monetary ones—when 
applying the proportionality test.  It follows that privacy-based concerns 
can also be taken into account when determining proportionality. 
Thus, when balancing the needs of the case and the likely benefit of 
discovery against its burden or expense, privacy burdens should be 
considered as well.  In many cases, disclosure of a complete, detailed 
mosaic of one’s personal life is too burdensome on individual privacy 
interests and is not justified by the needs of the case or is not outweighed 
by the likely benefit of discovery.  A social media account or smartphone 
may contain highly personal details about the individual, and revealing 
this information must meet the rules’ proportionality threshold. 
For example, a personal injury victim may place her physical 
condition or general emotional state at issue, but such claims do not 
support complete access to all portions of the plaintiff’s private social 
media account.  Rather, the private portions of the social media account 
should be disaggregated into component parts: timeline status updates, 
photographs, items uploaded by third parties that merely tag the plaintiff, 
one-on-one messages, geolocation data, and other items should be 
considered separately.  Additional parameters may rely on date ranges, 
the parties to a communication, and specific subject matter of each 
component part.  Similarly, a demand for the entire smartphone contents 
for an employee in a business dispute may be disproportionate given the 
privacy invasion such discovery poses, particularly if the employee is not 
a party to the suit.  Disaggregation should be considered to prevent 
unnecessary, disproportionate privacy invasions.
384
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In other cases, more severe and precise claims of injuries may 
support broader discovery into a party’s digital data compilations.  
Severe emotional distress claims and debilitating, permanent physical 
injuries may justify broader discovery in a personal injury case over 
garden-variety emotional harm or general pain and suffering.
385
  
Nonetheless, a forced password disclosure is never proportional.  Forcing 
litigants to hand over their passwords allows complete, unfettered access 
to all portions of a social media account, regardless of time frame, 
subject matter, or intended audience.  This approach also impedes the 
privacy rights of third parties who granted access to their own private 
information to the account-holder only and not to the account-holder’s 
adversaries in litigation.
386
  Even cases that justify broad discovery of 
digital data compilations must stop short of forced password disclosures. 
Lastly, as an additional measure of protection, courts should use 
protective orders to protect some social media or smartphone contents 
that are handed over in discovery.  The “good cause” standard already 
protects against particularized, serious harm, including embarrassment.
387
  
By extension, good cause may exist when discovery of large portions of 
digital data compilations amounts to an invasion of privacy.  The highly 
personal details contained in such a compilation should, at the very least, 
be shielded from public access.  Protective orders are an additional 
mechanism by which to protect privacy in this new digital discovery 
landscape, and courts should recognize that the good cause standard can 
be met through showing privacy-based harms. 
Achieving proportional privacy means that the privacy invasion in 
some cases may outweigh the likely benefits of the discovery.  Non-
pecuniary burdens are a necessary consideration as a limit to civil 
discovery and an important aspect of the proportionality analysis.  With 
the addition of privacy burdens, the proportionality test can serve as a 
mechanism for preventing overly broad discovery of digital data 
compilations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Large digital data compilations contain bits and pieces of personal 
information that, when looked at as a whole, create a detailed mosaic 
portrait of one’s life.  Discovery of these compilations runs the risk of 
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invading individual privacy rights.  As a result, meaningful protection 
against overly broad civil discovery is needed. The Federal Rules, 
throughout their development, have balanced broad discovery against 
countervailing principles that, at their core, recognize some privacy-
based limits.  In the 2015 amendments, the rules will emphasize the need 
to limit discovery based on proportionality: even relevant information is 
not discoverable if discovery is not proportional to the needs of the case.  
Although the proportionality analysis traditionally focuses on financial 
burden of the discovery, privacy burden should also be a factor.  By 
recognizing the non-pecuniary burden on privacy that discovery poses, 
courts can use the Federal Rules to effectively address the challenges 
created by new technology. 
 
